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Tacitus’ Annales present a comprehensive account of the formative early years of the 
Roman principate. Though the effects of the change from republic to principate are most 
frequently made evident through Tacitus’ portrayal of politics in the city of Rome itself, his 
illustration of the change of the military’s role under the principate also demonstrates these 
effects. The biggest effect that this transition had on the military, as portrayed by Tacitus, is the 
dramatic difference in the way that generals had to conduct themselves – he exemplifies this 
change through his descriptions of Germanicus Caesar and Domitius Corbulo. Germanicus, 
serving in the early days of the principate, conducts his campaigns in a style similar to those 
conducted during the republic. Though he is described by the narrator as realizing that his actions 
needed to be changed in order to combat Tiberius’ growing jealousy toward his success, 
Germanicus loses his life because of Tiberius’ jealous attitude. The Roman people, realizing this, 
are characterized as developing a fear of the vengeful jealousy of the princeps that extends 
beyond Tiberius’ principate into those of his successors. The one exception to the prevailing 
hesitant attitude of generals that arises from this realization is Corbulo. What the narrator seems 
to imply about Corbulo is that he has learned that t e way to succeed under the principate is to 
temper victories on the battlefield with successful acts of diplomacy. This discovery is described 
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Tacitus’ Annales present a comprehensive account of the formative early years of the 
Roman principate. A constant theme throughout the work is the Roman people’s attempts to 
cope with their uncertainty concerning what exactly the change from republic to principate – the 
change from new office-holders every year to a single fi ure holding imperium for decades – 
meant for their everyday lives. Though the effects of this change are most frequently made 
evident through Tacitus’ portrayal of politics in the city of Rome itself, his illustration of the 
change of the military’s role under the principate lso demonstrates these effects. The biggest 
effect that the transition from republic to principate had on the military, as portrayed by Tacitus, 
is the dramatic change in the way that generals had to conduct themselves.  
 There are two major generals described in the extant portions of the Annales: Germanicus 
Caesar, who serves under Augustus and Tiberius, and Domitius Corbulo, who serves under 
Claudius and Nero. Germanicus, serving in the early days of the principate, conducts his 
campaigns in a style similar to those conducted during the republic – he campaigns aggressively 
against his enemy and seizes every opportunity for combat that is presented to him. Though he is 
described by the narrator as realizing that his actions needed to be changed in order to combat 
Tiberius’ growing jealousy toward his success, thisrealization seems to have come too late, and 
Germanicus loses his life because of Tiberius’ jealous attitude.  
 After Germanicus’ death, Tiberius’ jealousy is described as having grown to a point at 
which its presence becomes evident to the rest of the Roman people as well. Tiberius is further 
described as acting on this jealousy and removing many powerful individuals from the positions 
that had allowed them to gain that power. The Roman people, realizing this, are characterized as 
developing a fear of the vengeful jealousy of the princeps that extends beyond Tiberius’ 
principate into those of his successors. That the Roman people are acting in accordance with this 
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realization is made clear throughout what survives of the Claudian and Neronian books of the 
Annales. 
 During Claudius’ and Nero’s reigns, Roman generals are consistently described as 
underachieving specifically because their success will be unwelcome to the princeps – the 
majority of military campaigns are either cut short or never even take place due to their generals’ 
fear of upsetting the princeps. The one exception to this attitude is Corbulo, whose battlefield 
exploits are narrated throughout four of the last six books of the Annales. What the narrator 
seems to imply about Corbulo is that he has learned that the way to succeed under the principate 
is to temper victories on the battlefield with successful acts of diplomacy. This discovery is 
described as Corbulo’s method of maintaining a successful military career under the principate. 
Through his descriptions of Corbulo’s successes as a general, the narrator shows his readers that 











Chapter 1: Germanicus and Tiberius 
 The first general who receives significant narrative ime in the Annales is Tiberius’ 
adopted son Germanicus, who has been called Tacitus’ “hero.”1 He is portrayed as the first 
general who attempts to adapt his actions to the establi hment of the principate. Although 
Tacitus depicts Germanicus as trying to conciliate himself with Tiberius’ newly-established role 
as princeps, Germanicus nevertheless loses his life as a result of this interaction. Tiberius feels 
jealousy toward Germanicus, although Germanicus is simply attempting to carry on a tradition of 
generalship as old as Rome itself. This jealousy is portrayed through Tacitus’ naming 
conventions, inter- and intratextual allusions, andTacitus’ own narrative voice. 
 
Tacitus’ Use of Caesar 
This relationship between Tiberius and Germanicus is revealed in the very way that 
Tacitus names his characters. Throughout the work there are titles (like Augusta or Caesar) 
which the narrator uses for multiple individuals. Within the first 14 chapters of Annales 1, for 
example, Germanicus is referred to as both Germanicus and Germanicus Caesar, while Tiberius 
is called Tiberius, Tiberius Caesar, and Caesar. And yet, once the narrative shifts to Germany 
and Germanicus enters the narrative, he is also frequently referred to by the name Caesar alone. 
Additionally within these first 14 chapters, Julius Caesar and Augustus are each referred to as 
simply Caesar. Throughout the course of Annales 1, in fact, eight different characters are 
referred to as Caesar or a compound thereof: Julius Caesar, Augustus, Germanicus, Tiberius, 
Drusus, Gaius Caligula, and Augustus’ adopted sons Gaius and Lucius.  Establishing the 
                                                 
1 Goodyear 1972: 114 
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conventions by which Tacitus used Caesar reveals a pattern behind his naming choices that 
allows us to interpret his ideas about these characters.  The results are charted below: 
 
Titles of Major Characters in Annales 1-3 
 “Name” 2 “Name + 
Caesar” 
“ Caesar” Total 
References 
Tiberius 164 (73.9%) 2 (0.9%) 56 (25.2%) 222 
Germanicus 121 (74.2%) 3 (1.8%) 39 (23.9%) 163 
Augustus 109 (93.2%) 1 (0.9%) 7 (5.9%) 117 
Drusus 
(Tiberius’ son) 
61 (92.4%) 1 (1.5%) 4 (6.1%) 66 
 
Through this tabulation of Annales 1-3, it can be seen that Tacitus uses Caesar very nearly the 
same percentage of the time for both Germanicus and Tiberius – 23.9% for Germanicus and 
25.2% for Tiberius – over 385 references.  
Additional evidence for analysis of Tacitus’ naming habits in the Annales is in whose 
voice Caesar alone is used, which is listed on the following chart: 








Tiberius 40 (71.4%) 9 (16.1%) 7 (12.5%) 56 
Germanicus 37 (94.9%) 2 (5.1%) 0 (0.0%) 39 
Augustus 6 (85.9%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 7 
Drusus 4 (100%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 
 
Through observation of the use of Caesar in oratio obliqua and oratio recta, we see Tacitus’ 
effort to conform to the naming conventions of the narrative time: with very few exceptions, 
Tiberius is the only character indirectly addressed as Caesar in these books, and he is the sole 
character who is directly addressed as such. When the arrator addresses a character other than 
                                                 
2 “Name” refers to the name by which the character is identified on the left-hand column of the chart. 
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Tiberius as Caesar and breaks the convention current to the time of the narrative, we may 
hypothesize that his use of the name Caesar is making a statement about that particular 
character.  That the name Caesar was usually reserved for addressing the princeps is supported 
by the naming habits of Velleius Paterculus, a contemporary of Tiberius: Tiberius is variously 
referred to as Tiberius, Tiberius Caesar, and Caesar, while Germanicus and Drusus are only 
Germanicus and Drusus. As Velleius is writing during Tiberius’ principate, his naming practices 
can perhaps be seen as an illustration of contemporary p actice. Therefore, if Velleius sees 
Caesar as an imperial title rather than an unmarked family cognomen, then Tacitus, writing 
nearly a century later, surely would have become accustomed to this use – the Julio-Claudian 
line (to which the cognomen Caesar originally belonged) had ceased holding the office of 
princeps after Nero, and Caesar had become merely the usual title by which the princeps was 
referred to. Pliny, for example, a contemporary of Tacitus, not only directly addresses Trajan as 
Caesar in his letters, but also refers to him in the third person as Caesar. 
When we examine those moments in which Tacitus the narrator refers to characters as 
Caesar, it becomes clear that he is associating the title with the possession of imperial or military 
power and not strictly with the position of the princeps. For example, when describing 
Germanicus’ nerves at the uprising of a number of German tribes, the narrator says: unde maior 
Caesari metus (“Whence Caesar’s fear was greater,” 1.60.1). Thoug Germanicus is not the 
princeps, he is at the head of an army and in possession of imperium, so he is Caesar. 
 Tacitus also uses Caesar through the mouths of his characters not solely for the princeps, 
but for anybody from the imperial family who holds some position of authority. For example, in 
the first meeting of the senate after Augustus’ death, Asinius Gallus asks Tiberius “interrogo… 
Caesar, quam partem rei publicae mandari tibi velis” (“I ask, Caesar, which part of the republic 
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you would like to be handed over to you,” 1.12.2).3 This example is of particular interest to our 
study. The fact that Gallus is asking such a question shows that he sees Tiberius as holding a 
position superior to his own, but the question per se tells us that Tiberius is in possession of no 
official power. In the Annales, then, it seems clear that Caesar is not reserved solely for 
principes, but for anybody possessing some significant amount f power. 
This assertion is further supported by Tacitus’ naming habits for Augustus. As can be 
seen in the above charts, Augustus is overwhelmingly referred to as Augustus in Annales 1-3 
(109 times), while he is only Caesar seven times. Furthermore, each of the seven times that he is 
called Caesar refers either to past times in which he was still the princeps or to decisions that 
were made by him while princeps4, while the name Augustus is much more often found in 
reference to him through the lens of the narrative present, in which he has already died (e.g., 
qui…maestitiam eius ob excessum Augusti solarentur, 1.14.3). This is not to say that Tacitus uses 
alternative names (Germanicus, Tiberius, Augustus) to imply a lack of power, but that he seems, 
in accordance with the times in which he himself lives, to associate “Caesar” with the active 
possession of power. 
 This point becomes even clearer when the naming statistics of Augustus are compared 
with those of Drusus the Younger, neither of whom possess much power during the time period 
covered by the narrative of the Annales: Tacitus’ naming habits for each of these charactes are 
nearly identical. Each of the four times that Drusus is called Caesar occurs within the narrative 
of the uprising of the Pannonian legions, covered in only four chapters (1.25-28), in which 
Drusus is acting as Tiberius’ representative and is described as possessing the same power as 
                                                 
3 All translations and emphases of Latin and Greek ar  my own 
4 1.2.1, 5.2, 10.2; 2.2.1, 2.2, 3.2; 3.24.3 
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Tiberius for appeasing the legions’ demands (ut sine cunctatione concederet quae statim trubui 
possent, 1.25.3). The examples of both Augustus and Drusus, then, strengthen the argument that 
Tacitus uses “Caesar” specifically when a character is in active possession of imperial power.  
Tacitus’ naming conventions for Germanicus manifest themselves precisely as the above 
examples predict. Of the thirty-nine times that he is called Caesar, Germanicus is in Germany at 
the head of the Rhine legions for thirty-three of those occasions, and in Syria in possession of 
proconsular imperium for five (maiusque imperium [Germanico]…quam iis qui sorte aut missu 
principis obtinerent, 2.43.1). The one instance in which he is not the highest-ranking official in a 
province comes after his death, when the nobles of the city are incensed that “a Caesar is 
mourned by the voices of a Vitellius and a Veranius, while Plancina is defended by the 
imperator and the Augusta” (Vitellii et Veranii voce defletum Caesarem, ab imperatore et 
Augusta defensam Plancinam, 3.17.2). Here though, as my translation suggests – i.e., “a Caesar” 
– the reference seems much more likely to be to the family name than the imperial title: the 
people are enraged that the noblest men mourning Germanicus, a man of such high birth, are 
men like Vitellius and Veranius, while Tiberius and Livia are too busy to do so.  
This generality of this use of Caesar is supported by the convention by which Tacitus 
uses the title Caesar: Germanicus, being dead, is not in possession of any power and therefore 
does not receive the title. The immediate context also supports this: the idea of the sentence is 
not that specifically Vitellius and Veranius are mourning Germanicus’ death, but that men of 
Vitellius’ and Veranius’ status are the ones mourning him. This becomes a much more plausible 
argument when we also point out that Tiberius and Livia are referred to here not by their names, 
but by their titles imperator and Augusta. The use of imperator and Augusta, which are both 
clearly titles, lends much more strength to the assumption Vitellius and Veranius are being used 
8 
 
not as names but as general titles as well. The genrality of the titles of the other people involved 
in the sentence suggests that C esar here is also being used in a general, familial sense. 
Therefore, the connotation that Tacitus places upon “Caesar” remains consistent with his use for 
Germanicus: he is portrayed as constantly possessing a significant amount of power while he 
lives. Thus, Tacitus’ naming conventions throughout the Annales point to his perception of 
Germanicus as possessing a similar amount of power to Tiberius. 
 
The Details of Germanicus and Tiberius’ Relationship 
 The narrator further emphasizes the power that Germanicus possessed through his 
portrayal of Tiberius’ strong feelings of jealousy and fear towards him. Tacitus’ Tiberius seems 
to have recognized the amount of influence that Germanicus had, and acted in a way that made 
this quite clear. Early in the work, the narrator openly states these feelings: causa praecipua ex 
formidine, ne Germanicus…habere imperium quam exspectare mallet (“The chief reason [for 
aggressively asserting his control over the empire upon Augustus’ death] was out of fear, lest 
Germanicus…prefer to have imperium rather than waitfor it,” 1.7.6).5 These actions of fear and 
jealousy, in turn, alerted Germanicus to Tiberius’ feelings, and Germanicus is shown making 
numerous attempts to mollify them.  
 Aside from discussion of the workings of the imperial family at large (1.3.5, 14.3), 
Germanicus’ introduction to the narrative, after an introduction to the legionary uprising in 
Germany, comes in chapter 34. This chapter, the first in which Germanicus is an active 
participant, sets the stage for the conflict between him and Tiberius. The first sentence of the 
chapter runs thus: Sed Germanicus quanto summae spei propior, tanto impensius pro Tiberio niti 
                                                 
5 Dio concurs, though not so eloquently: [ὀ Τιβέριος] τὸν δὲ δὴ Γερμανικὸν δεινῶς ἐφοβεῖτο (57.4.1). 
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(“But however much more closely Germanicus approached t e greatest promise, that much more 
eagerly did he exert himself on Tiberius’ behalf,” 1.34.1). The reason for this striving was 
introduced in the previous chapter, when Tacitus describes Germanicus as “worried about the 
secret hatred of his uncle and grandmother against h m, the causes for which were more bitter 
because they were undeserved” (anxius occultis in se patrui aviaeque odiis, quorum causae 
acriores quia iniquae, 1.33.1).  
 This phrase nitor pro aliquo (seen above at 1.34.1) occurs just one other time in Tacitus, 
and only three times before him.6 The other Tacitean usage comes at His . 1.55.4, describing the 
legions of Upper Germany on the first of January, 69 C.E. – nullo pro Galba nitente. This is, of 
course, the first day of the infamous Year of the Four Emperors. Asked to renew their oath to 
Galba, the current princeps, the soldiers seriously consider revolting, going so far as to deface all 
of the portraiture of Galba around their camp. But when they realize that they have nobody 
worthwhile with whom they can replace Galba, they halfheartedly swear the oath nonetheless. 
As the Historiae were written before the Annales, it is possible that this scene was intended to be 
recalled by the reader of the Annales. Tacitus there describes Germanicus as striving on Tiberius’ 
behalf not through true loyalty, but because he realiz s that he himself is becoming too popular, 
and this assertion is immediately followed by the sw aring of an oath to this possibly-
undeserving emperor. Assuming that Tacitus is making an intertextual allusion to his own 
Historiae is quite likely – Woodman makes a strong case for such an allusion to the Historiae in 
Tacitus’ description of Germanicus’ visit to the infamous Teutoburg Forest in Annales 1.7 
Therefore, the explicit description of the loyalty shown to the office of the princeps as opposed 
                                                 
6  Livy 35.10.10, cum pro C. Laelio niteretur ; Ov. Pont. 3.1.40, niti pro me nocte dieque decet ; Plin. Ep. 3.9.8, non 
pro se sed pro causa niteretur. 
7 Woodman 1979 
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to the princeps himself, exemplified in both cases by the swearing of an oath, makes this allusion 
to the Historiae seem very likely to have been purposeful. Germanicus’ striving for Tiberius, 
then, read in the light of this passage from the Historiae, illustrates the narrator’s implication that 
Tiberius, like Galba, was viewed by his contemporaries, including Germanicus, as a princeps 
who was undeserving of the position. 
A short while later, when Germanicus is delivering his second speech directed toward 
quelling the German uprising, he makes a further effort to assert publicly his loyalty to Tiberius. 
The opening words of the speech are “Non mihi uxor aut filius patre et re publica cariores sunt” 
(“‘Neither wife nor son are dearer to me than father and country,’” 1.42.1). These first words 
demonstrate Germanicus’ loyalty to Tiberius not only i  the subordination of his wife and child 
to his father and his country, but also in the close a sociation between his father and country. 
Tiberius’ chief reasons for disliking Germanicus in the Annales are fear of his military successes 
and his popularity with and importance to the Roman soldiery – his popularity among the men 
who held complete control of the r s publica.8  The power that the soldiery possessed was 
obvious to Tiberius through the actions of both Augustus and Julius Caesar, and to our author 
through, among other examples, the year 69 C.E. Germanicus’ importance was so strong partly 
due to the reciprocation of those feelings – the importance that the soldiery had for him. So in 
regarding Tiberius and the r s publica as the chief entities to whom he was loyal, Germanicus 
makes a rather strong statement. 
An additional observation from the above quotation is the fact that Germanicus uses the 
word pater to describe Tiberius. In his discussion of Tiberius’ hatred toward Germanicus, the 
                                                 
8 1.52.1: …quod largendis pecuniis et missione festinata favorem militum quaesivisset, bellica quoque Germanici 
gloria angebantur.  
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narrator refers to the “secret hatred of his uncle and grandmother against him” (occultis in se 
patrui aviaeque odiis, 1.33.1). This word patruus, while its denotation is simply “a paternal 
uncle,” has the connotation of someone who is “typically harsh and censorious” (OLD 1b). In 
fact, the narrator himself never uses the word pater for the relationship between Germanicus and 
Tiberius, but always patruus.9 Germanicus is the only character who uses the word pater to refer 
to his relationship with Tiberius,10 besides Tiberius himself (and this one instance is a generality 
that is indirectly about both Germanicus and Drusus: imul adulescentibus excusatum quaedam 
ad patrem reicere, [“At the same time, it is excusable for young men to refer to their father for 
some matters,” 1.47.2]).  
Aside from comments by Tiberius, Germanicus, or the narrator, there are only two other 
passages in which the relationship between Tiberius and Germanicus is specifically referenced. 
The first of these comes from the collective mouth of the Roman people, incensed at the 
treatment of Germanicus’ funeral procession: non fratrem, nisi unius diei via, non patruum 
saltem porta tenus obvium (“His brother did not come out to meet it, except at a distance of one 
day from the city, his uncle did not even come out t  the city gate, 3.5.2). In their outrage at the 
disrespect shown to Germanicus’ remains, the people use the word fratrem for Drusus, but 
patruum, as opposed to patrem, for Tiberius. The use of fratrem indicates their 
acknowledgement of Germanicus’ adoption by Tiberius, so the choice to use patruum here 
suggests a conscious choice of a word that brings with it a negative connotation.11 Though it is 
true that there is no single word for step-brother in Latin, the juxtaposition of non fratrem…non 
                                                 
9 1.33.1 ; 2.5.2, 14.4, 43.5 ; 3.3.3, 31.1. 
10 1.42.1, 42.4 ; 2.71.1 
11 For further discussion on the people’s use of patruus, see Woodman and Martin 1996 ad loc. (101) 
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patruum, when a simpler possibility like non Drusum…non Tiberium was available, draws 
specific attention to the fact that Tiberius is not actually Germanicus’ father. 
The second description of Tiberius and Germanicus’ relationship comes from the 
nobility. After Germanicus’ death, Gnaeus Piso is put on trial for his murder and his wife, whom 
many held to be equally responsible, is acquitted of her alleged crime. Here Tacitus describes the 
“secret complaints of all the nobles” (optimi cuiusque secreti questus) about the result of the 
proceedings: 
A Caesar is mourned by the voices of a Vitellius and  Veranius, while Plancina is 
defended by the imperator and the Augusta. So let her turn her poisons and her so 
happily tested arts against Agrippina and her children, let her satisfy so 
outstanding a grandmother and uncle with the blood of the most miserable 
household. 
Vitellii et Veranii voce defletum Caesarem, ab imperatore et Augusta defensam 
Plancinam. proinde venena et artes tam feliciter expertas verteret in Agrippinam, 
in liberos eius, egregiamque aviam ac patruum sanguine miserrimae domus 
exsatiaret. (3.17.2) 
From the previous two examples, then, we see that Germanicus is the only character who 
chooses to use the word pater to describe Tiberius’ relationship to him. The narrato , as well as 
various groups of Romans, make the decision to use patruus instead, seeming not accidentally to 
choose the word with a negative connotation. 
 An additional effect that the use of patruus has on the relationship between Germanicus 
and Tiberius is that it draws attention to the factthat Germanicus is a Caesar independently of 
Tiberius; he, unlike Tiberius, is a Caesar by birth. T is surely adds fuel to the fire of Tiberius’ 
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jealousy – Germanicus’ independent “royalty” created a situation in which the Roman people, 
were they to decide to turn away from Tiberius, alre dy had a legitimate successor at hand. One 
could even argue that, because Tiberius was only related to Augustus through adoption, while 
Germanicus was by birth, that Germanicus was a more legitimate option for the position of 
princeps. This independent presence in the Julio-Claudian family, coupled with Germanicus’ 
popularity among the Roman people at large (which will be discussed below) made for a very 
threatening combination. 
 
Why Tiberius (Objectively) has nothing to Fear 
After the final victory over the Germans for the campaigning season of 16 C.E., a rout of 
even greater degree than the previous one, Germanicus has his soldiers set up a victory 
monument bearing the following inscription: debellatis inter Rhenum Albimque nationibus 
exercitum Tiberii Caesaris ea monimenta Marti et Iovi et Augusto sacravisse (“The army of 
Tiberius Caesar, having routed the peoples between the Rhine and the Elbe, dedicated these 
spoils to Mars, Jupiter, and Augustus,” 2.22.1). Here the narrator adds an explanation of the 
reason for the description of the army as Tiberius’ alone: de se nihil addidit, metu invidiae an 
ratus conscientiam facti satis esse (“About himself [Germanicus] added nothing, either through 
fear of jealousy or because he believed that awareness of the deed was enough,” 2.22.1). This 
sentence strongly suggests, not just through an interpretation of Germanicus’ actions, but through 
the voice of the narrator himself, the possibility that Tiberius’ hatred toward Germanicus was not 
only known to Germanicus, but was shaping his actions.  
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However, Germanicus’ exclusion of himself from the monument exactly followed 
military precedent.12 The truly odd action would have been if he had included his own name in 
the inscription.13 Whether or not this jealousy truly motivated Germanicus’ actions is no longer 
possible to know; what can be seen here, though, is t at the narrator is making an effort to 
convince his reader that this was the case by explaining an action that needed no explanation. By 
including this explanation, the narrator gives himself an opportunity not only to depict 
Germanicus as respectful of his position in the principate, but also to again mention Tiberius’ 
characteristic jealousy. 
Though Germanicus makes strong displays of his subordination to his new princeps, he 
nonetheless dies (according to his own opinion, and seemingly Tacitus’ as well) through the 
agency of that princeps. What, then, did Germanicus do that was so grievous as to overshadow 
the significant loyalty to Tiberius that he had professed throughout the German campaigns? It 
seems, in the narrator’s opinion at least, not to have been what Germanicus was doing, but the 
way in which his actions were being received by the military and by the Roman people at large 
that caused his fall.  
Already in Book One, before Germanicus’ major German victories had been 
accomplished, Tiberius had demonstrated feelings of enmity toward him. In the year 15, 
Germanicus feels a longing to bury the remains of the legions that had been slaughtered in the 
Teutoburg Forest, an action that he is described as taking “since the entirety of the army that was 
present was moved to pity for relatives, friends, and dditionally the fortunes of war and the lot 
                                                 
12 Campbell 1984: 123: “Augustus accepted an acclamation for victories won by Tiberius, other members of the 
imperial family, and senatorial legates. This determined normal practice thereafter…and when in 11 B.C. his troops 
proclaimed Drusus imperator, Augustus did not allow him to accept the title, but took it for himself.” 
13 Cornelius Gallus had erected his own likeness through ut Egypt and had inscribed his achievements upon the 
pyramids during Augustus’ principate, for which he was disenfranchised and exiled, and eventually committed 
suicide. (see Cass. Dio 53.23.5-7) 
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of man” (permoto ad miserationem omni qui aderat exercitu ob propinquos, amicos, denique ob 
casus bellorum et sortem hominum, 1.61.1), and that the narrator describes as “a mostwelcome 
offering to the dead from an associate of the grief of those present” (gratissimo munere in 
defunctos et praesentibus doloris socius, 1.62.1). This deed, portrayed in an overwhelmingly 
positive and selfless light by the narrator, is nevertheless not pleasing to Tiberius:  
Which Tiberius hardly approved, whether he was dragging all of Germanicus’ 
deeds into a less favorable light, or he believed that the army would be sluggish 
going into battle and more fearful of the enemy because of the sight of the 
unburied dead.  
quod Tiberio haud probatum, seu cuncta Germanici in deterius trahenti, sive 
exercitum imagine caesorum insepultorumque tardatum ad proelia et 
formidolosiorem hostium credebat. (1.62.2). 
Though the narrator presents these options as equally valid, and the detail afforded to the second 
option seems to lend it greater legitimacy, his earli r explanation of the men’s reaction to the 
burial, in this very same chapter, undercuts that second option: omnes ut coniunctos, ut 
consanguineos aucta in hostem ira maesti simul et inf nsi condebant (“The men, their wrath 
toward the enemy increased, buried every body as if burying their kinsmen, mournful as well as 
enraged,” 1.62.1). This sentence, coming before Tibrius’ reaction, does away with the second of 
the two options before it has even been presented – a soldier who is infensus (“ready for the 
attack,” OLD 1) because he had to bury his butchered countrymen will have no apprehensions 
about fighting the enemy who did the butchering. Since Germanicus’ actions seem to have been 
taken to gain an advantage over his enemies, the narrator seems to be specifically pointing out 
Tiberius’ efforts to drag Germanicus’ character through the dirt, which is not surprising in the 
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light of the previous reference to Tiberius’ odium toward Germanicus. Suetonius would certainly 
agree with this suggestion, stating his opinion that “Tiberius disparaged Germanicus to the point 
that he made light of his renowned deeds as if trifles, and protested against his most glorious 
victories as if harmful to the republic” (Germanico usque adeo obtrectavit ut et praeclara facta 
eius pro supervacuis elevarit et gloriosissimas victor as ceu damnosas rei publicae increparet, 
Tib. 52).  
 Conversely Shotter, attempting to rehabilitate Tacitus’ Tiberius, argues that Tiberius’ 
reaction to this situation is “in no way malicious” and that Germanicus’ soldiers’ burial of the 
legions “must have been utterly demoralising.”14 Though there is no way that we can know the 
soldiers’ feelings about this event, the narrator’s characterization of the soldiers as in 
hostem…infensi is surely his effort to make his reader believe that ey were not demoralized by 
this action. Pelling, at any rate, comes out on this side of the debate, stating simply that Tiberius 
“comes out as unattractive” in his reaction to Germanicus’ decision.15 
The biggest specific accusation that Tiberius would level against Germanicus, it seems, 
would be that he had aspirations of doing away withthe principate and restoring the old republic. 
Though Germanicus never makes any such assertion, nor does the narrator, the belief that he 
would be willing to do so is put into the collective mouth of the Roman people on more than one 
occasion.16  
                                                 
14 Shotter 1968: 201-202 
15 Pelling 1993: 76 
16 Germanicus’ republican characterization has been discussed several times in the past. Pelling 1993 describes 
Germanicus’ style of generalship as “old-fashioned, bloody, but glorious; and the way of Tiberius, diplomatic, 
modern, unglamorous, but highly effective” (77), and O’Gorman 2000 calls him “a doomed republican in the new 
world of the principate” who “represents a past which becomes ‘the republican past’ only when it is viewed from the 
present of the principate” (47). Kelly 2010 calls the difference between Tiberius and Germanicus “a contrast 
between the styles of two political systems: the Republic and the Principate” (231). If Tiberius is truly the 
embodiment of the imperial system, then his assumption that Germanicus was a republican at heart would not have 
been a difficult one to make. 
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The first time that this desire for a restored republic is found is in Germanicus’ 
introduction into the narrative. While introducing Germanicus’ familial connections, the narrator 
comments that: 
The remembrance of Drusus among the Roman people was obviously great, and it 
was believed that if he had gained control of things, he would have restored 
freedom. From this came the same regard and hope toward Germanicus.  
quippe Drusi magna apud populum Romanum memoria, credebaturque, si rerum 
potitus foret, libertatem redditurus; unde in Germanicum favor et spes eadem. 
(1.33.2) 
Germanicus’ desire to restore the republic, then, is ot only a rumor, but a rumor that originated 
about his biological father. Nonetheless the paranoia that the narrator shows to be a defining 
characteristic of Tiberius allows this rumor to take hold in his mind.17 The narrator’s use of the 
adverb “quippe” to introduce this sentence associates it strongly with the previous one, which 
describes the “secret hatred of his uncle and grandmother against him, the causes for which were 
more bitter because they were undeserved” (1.33.1).  
The close association between the rumors about Germanicus and Tiberius’ hatred for him 
sets forth what the narrator likely believed was the true nature of the relationship between 
Tiberius and Germanicus. First, that Tiberius was aware of this “regard and hope toward 
Germanicus” among the Roman people, enough of a reason on its own to be jealous of his 
(adopted) son. Second, he believes that Tiberius put ome stock in the reasons behind this regard 
and hope and believed that Germanicus had at least some desire to do away with the principate. 
                                                 
17 Tacitus’ characterization of Tiberius to be discussed in the following chapter 
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And finally, he implies that Germanicus was aware not only of Tiberius’ hatred toward him but 
also the reasons that led him to that hatred, illustrated by the assertion of his belief that they were 
“undeserved” (iniquae).   
The clause that contains this word (quorum causae acriores quia iniquae) notably (and 
technically incorrectly) does not contain a verb. While the missing verb would clearly be a form 
of esse, this omission seems to serve a purpose. By using the indicative, sunt, the narrator would 
be making the claim that these reasons were obj ctively unfair, the sort of commitment that he 
often seems unwilling to make. The alternative option would be the subjunctive, sint. This 
option, though, while asserting that this was what Germanicus thought, would still grammatically 
be demonstrating the narrator’s belief that this waGermanicus’ opinion. The complete omission 
of the verb, then, allows readers to fill in the blank themselves. Germanicus’ status as the subject 
of the previous clause allows readers to conclude that this is Germanicus’ own opinion (that is, 
that sint is understood), and the way that Germanicus’ relationship with Tiberius is described 
does not at all discourage such a conclusion. Therefore, the readers come to the same conclusion 
as the narrator, but feel that they have done so independently. 
The next mention of the people’s belief in Germanicus’ desire to restore the republic 
comes after his death. When Germanicus’ remains are being carried to Augustus’ tomb, the 
Roman people follow along, shouting “The republic has fallen! There is no hope left!” 
(concidisse rem publicam, nihil spei reliquum, 3.4.1). If we recall the Roman people’s unfulfilled 
belief about Drusus and their similar feelings toward Germanicus (quippe Drusi magna apud 
populum Romanum memoria, credebaturque, si rerum potitus foret, libertatem redditurus; unde 
in Germanicum favor et spes eadem, 1.33.2), the implication of this lament is that thepeople 
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believed that Germanicus, had he eventually come into the office of princeps, would have 
restored the old republic.  
This belief among the Roman people that Germanicus would restore the old republic, that 
he was not truly a part of the “imperial” dynasty, also manifests itself through Tacitus’ shaping 
of the text. This manifestation begins as early as T citus’ first use of Germanicus’ name. Annales 
1.3 begins thus: Ceterum Augustus subsidia dominationi…extulit (“But Augustus promoted as 
successors for his dominion…,” 1.3.1). This lengthy sentence lists all of the men whom 
Augustus had marked out as potential successors, as well as the ways in which death stole many 
of them away, finishing with the only candidate who survived, Tiberius. The following sentence 
describes one final potential candidate for the succession: 
But, by Hercules!, Germanicus, son of Drusus, [Augustus] placed at the head of 
the eight legions near the Rhine, and ordered that he be adopted by Tiberius, 
although Tiberius had a young son in his family, so that [Augustus] could stand 
upon greater protection.  
at Hercule Germanicum, Druso ortum, octo apud Rhenum legionibus imposuit 
adscirique per adoptionem a Tiberio iussit, quamquam esset in domo Tiberii filius 
iuvenis, sed quo pluribus munimentis insisteret..(1.3 5) 
The “strongly adversative…expletive”18 at Hercule, which the narrator uses in his own voice 
only one other time in the entirety of the Annales, is used here to introduce Germanicus, the 
member of the family who was conspicuously absent from the previous list of potential 
successors. The main emphasis of this sentence is of a military nature: while Augustus does 
                                                 
18 Goodyear 1972: 114 
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order Tiberius to adopt Germanicus as an additional choice for succession (quo pluribus 
munimentis insisteret), the emphasized clause of the sentence (felt throug  the placement of at 
Hercule) is that Augustus had placed Germanicus in charge of the eight German legions. 
The interjection at Hercule, though, when read in light of the one other use in the 
narrator’s voice in the Annales, could also have some impact on the latter half of the sentence. In 
its later use in the Annales, at Hercule is expressing the shame that the narrator feels about 
Rome’s reliance on foreign grain while Italy is facing a potential famine:   
But, by Hercules!, Italy once carried grain to far-away provinces with the legions 
and now does not contend with barrenness, but we inst ad cultivate Africa and 
Egypt, and the lives of the Roman people are entrusted to ships and accidents  
at Hercule olim Italia legionibus longinquas in provincias commeatus portabat, 
nec nunc infecunditate laboratur, sed Africam potius et Aegyptum exercemus, 
navibusque et casibus vita populi Romani permissa et. (12.43.2) 
Though the situations do not, at first glance, have much in common, the rarity of at Hercule in 
the narrator’s voice, found in only these two instances in the Annales, must indicate some 
common theme. The clear shame being felt by the narrator in the latter of the two passages could 
also be felt in the former, prompted by the fact that Tiberius was forced to adopt Germanicus 
when he would have been hard-pressed to find a better successor anywhere else. Tacitus’ 
favoritism toward Germanicus in the Annales certainly does not rule out such a reading. In 
addition to this favoritism of Germanicus, the postnement of Germanicus to his own individual 
sentence, the military emphasis of that sentence, and the use of the expletive Hercule serve to 
separate Germanicus from the rest of the imperial household as a man for whom the military is 
more important than imperial politics and succession.  
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Germanicus himself is also portrayed as expressing that his aspirations are of a military 
and not necessarily political nature. He spends the entirety of his second speech to the mutinous 
German legions discussing the shame that the soldiers should feel for acting in such an 
insubordinate fashion. Amidst his rebuking, he refers to Julius Caesar’s quelling of a mutiny 
merely by referring to his soldiers as Quirites (“citizens,” as opposed to commilitones, “fellow 
soldiers”19) and Augustus’ terrifying his disloyal soldiers with just a single look (1.42.3). He 
follows these stories with this concession: nos, ut nondum eosdem, ita ex illis ortos (“I, though 
not yet the same as those men, but nonetheless descended from them…” 1.42.3). Comparing 
himself to Julius Caesar and Augustus, with specific reference to his descent from them (a claim 
that Tiberius cannot make), Germanicus at first glance seems to be affirming that he sees himself 
as eventually becoming princeps. The content of the two stories to which he alludes, however, 
strongly suggests otherwise.  
The first of these stories refers to Caesar’s dealing with a mutinous tenth legion after 
arriving to Rome during his civil war with Pompey. Caesar addresses the mutineers, who are 
demanding discharge after long service, and calls them Quirites, which so strongly bothers the 
men that they profess that they are still Caesar’s soldiers, and continue to fight.20 The second 
story, Augustus’ frightening look that terrifies his soldiers into submission, refers to his dealing 
with an uprising of the soldiers at Brundisium after the Battle of Actium. While this version of 
the story is not paralleled elsewhere (Suet. Aug. 17 and Cass. Dio 51.3.4 have Augustus 
appeasing legions at Brundisium through more diplomatic means), the fact that the narrator has 
Germanicus portray Augustus in a more soldierly fashion (as opposed to ambassadorial) should 
                                                 
19 e.g., Caes. BG 4.25.3 
20 See Suet. Iul. 70; Cass. Dio 42.53.3; App. B Civ 2.93 
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not be ignored. Both of these stories show their subjects acting not as principes, but as 
generals.21 In accordance with this characterization, then, Germanicus’ nondum must mean not 
that he is not yet princeps (or, in Caesar’s case, dictator in perpetuum), but that he is not yet a 
general on the same level of these two very successful ones. Therefore, this statement implies 
that Germanicus’ ambitions seem to be of a purely military nature. 
Tiberius’ actions also emphasize Germanicus’ nature as a warrior. After his victories over 
the Germans in Book Two, Germanicus receives constant letters (crebris epistulis, 2.26.2) from 
Tiberius advising that he return to Rome to receive his triumph. Ignoring the numerous 
additional reasons why Tiberius believes he should leave Germany to the Germans, Germanicus 
requests one additional year at the head of the legions, in which he believed the war could be 
brought to a close. This requests goads Tiberius into offering Germanicus a further honor – the 
consulship. At this request, Germanicus finally gives in to his uncle’s demands, though he 
believes that he has figured out Tiberius’ actual re son for wanting him to leave Germany: haud 
cunctatus est ultra Germanicus, quamquam fingi ea seque per invidiam parto iam decori 
abstrahi intellegeret (“Germanicus hardly delayed any longer, although he understood that the 
reasons were feigned and that he was being dragged back, when his glory was just at hand, on 
account of jealousy,” 2.26.5).  
The order in which Tiberius offers these enticements to Germanicus speaks to his opinion 
of what sort of man Germanicus was. The frequency of the letters (crebris) and the plethora of 
excuses characterize Tiberius as being very eager to r move Germanicus from the fortunate 
                                                 
21 Though both of these examples portray their subjects a ting as generals during civil wars, it should not be 
assumed that Germanicus is being characterized as holding on to revolutionary aspirations. In the first century C.E., 
one would be hard pressed to find a recent example – especially one involving relations of Germanicus – of a 
quelled mutiny in anything but a civil conflict. 
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situation that he had found himself in. But his firt offer, the triumph, suggests that he wanted to 
remove Germanicus from this situation in a way thatreinforced that he was merely a soldier. It is 
only after Germanicus denies this opportunity that Tiberius makes him an offer he can’t refuse – 
a second consulship. Only when his back is against the wall does Tiberius offer Germanicus a 
position of true political power. But even when Germanicus accepts this offer, Tiberius is able to 
find a way to lessen any threat that Germanicus’ consulship might have had against him. 
 
Getting Rid of Germanicus 
After Germanicus’ triumph and Tiberius’ announcement that he himself will be 
Germanicus’ colleague in the consulship, an additional honor, Tiberius realizes that the people 
still didn’t believe that he had any true affection f r Germanicus and decides to “do away with 
the young man with the appearance of an honor” (nec ideo sincerae caritatis fidem adsecutus 
amoliri iuvenem specie honoris statuit, 2.42.1). And what could be less suspicious than sending 
Germanicus away to fight a war? Right away, Tiberius eports to the senate that the turmoil in 
Armenia must be dealt with, and that the only thing capable of doing so is Germanicus’ good 
sense (nec posse motum Orientem nisi sapientia Germanici componi, 2.43.1). It seems 
convenient for Tiberius that, less than a year before Germanicus was set to take up his 
consulship, he finds a reason to send him out of the city.  
The narrator also seems to find Tiberius’ sudden requi ment of Germanicus’ particular 
skillset somewhat convenient, saying that Tiberius “drummed up reasons or snatched up 
whatever he happened upon” (struxitque causas aut forte oblatas arripuit, 2.42.1). Regardless of 
which of these possibilities one might believe, Tiber us comes off poorly in this situation. If, as 
the narrator’s first option suggests, Tiberius invented these reasons, then he is creating a 
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fallacious campaign specifically in order to get Germanicus out of the city. This is not at all an 
unreasonable assumption to make, as the narrator has shown Tiberius performing a very similar 
action in the previous book.  
In his final days, Augustus had spoken of multiple ndividuals whom he had seen as 
potential candidates for the principate. Once Tiberius became princeps, the narrator says that all 
of those men, besides Lepidus, “were shortly ensnared by various crimes that Tiberius was 
drumming up” (omnes…variis mox criminibus struente Tiberio circumventi sunt, 1.13.3). Struo, 
a common word in Tacitus, is only used three times in this figurative sense in the first two books 
of the Annales, as opposed to eight literal uses (e.g., Caesar congeriem armorum struxit, 2.22.2). 
Further, it should not be ignored that both of its ir t two metaphorical uses in the work are in 
reference to Tiberius, while its literal uses have  variety of subjects. Certainly, then, taking into 
account the various similarities between these two uses of struo, we should read these episodes 
as interacting with one another. If we are to believ  the narrator’s first suggestion about Tiberius’ 
actions, that he had “drummed up” reasons to send Germanicus to Armenia, we must read it as 
Tiberius making a conscious effort to get rid of a m n whom he felt threatened his grasp on the 
principate. 
If, on the other hand, Tiberius was snatching up an opportunity that he happened upon 
(causas…forte oblatas arripuit) and this was a legitimate situation that needed to be dealt with, a 
previous statement of his is shown to have been false. When he had originally recalled 
Germanicus to the city, Tiberius had told him that Drusus needed a campaign to win some honor 
of his own, and that the Germans were the only enemies left to fight (nullo tum alio hoste non 
nisi apud Germanias, 2.26.4). The extended description of this situation in Armenia (2.42.2-5) 
suggests that this was not a sudden uprising, but asitu tion that had been escalating over a long 
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period of time, so Tiberius’ reason for calling Germanicus back seems to have been embellished. 
Therefore, whether he had invented a reason to call Germanicus back to Rome or one to send 
him away again, Tiberius is shown to have been dishonest and Germanicus’ earlier suspicion that 
Tiberius’ explanations were dishonest (fingi ea…intellegeret, 2.26.5) is proven true.  
Just as quickly as Tiberius had created the problem of having Germanicus in the city as 
consul for an entire year, he solved it – Germanicus would spend (at least) the year in Armenia 
and would be consul in name alone. So, though his offer f a consulship went against his desire 
for Germanicus to remain solely a military man, Tiber us satisfied that same desire by sending 
him off for another war.  
As has been shown throughout this chapter, Tacitus haracterizes Germanicus principally 
as a soldier. This is not illustrated solely through the voice of the narrator, but also through the 
voice of the Roman people, through Germanicus’ actions, and through Tiberius’ actions. This 
then begs the question why Tiberius, retired from the military and in sole control of the entirety 
of the Roman empire, would feel such strong jealousy toward a mere soldier. The time in which 
these events are occurring can provide an answer.  
As the Mariuses, Sullas, Pompeys, and Caesars of the world have shown us, the quickest 
path to political power during the late republic was through military success. While the imperial 
family might have realized that the principate had changed how the empire was run, neither the 
people nor even the senate are shown to have adapted to the change so quickly. The Annales is 
the first account to depict Tiberius’ principate as t king place not in the old res publica, but in a 
wholly new form of government under the rule of a princeps. Having first breached the idea of 
the division between the republic and the principate in the Dialogus de oratoribus, written 
(likely) in 102 C.E. and set (again, likely) in 75 C.E., Tacitus applies his opinions about the 
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nature of the Roman government to the time period during which, to the modern mind, the 
principate emerged from the republic’s ashes.22 The reaction of the senate and people to 
Tiberius’ principate, without the benefit of hindsight that Tacitus enjoys, would therefore have 
been neither uniform nor quick.  
This slow adjustment is clear through the senators’ confusion, upon Augustus’ death, as 
to exactly which powers Tiberius will hold (1.11-13), exemplified by Asinius Gallus’ question 
“‘ interrogo…Caesar, quam partem rei publicae mandari tibi velis’” (1.12.2). The people also 
seem to have momentarily believed that the principate was more of a passing trend than anything 
else, when they lament Germanicus’ death and exclaim that “The republic has fallen! There is no 
hope left!” (concidisse rem publicam, nihil spei reliquum, 3.4.1). Their belief that things were 
the same in Rome as they had been during the republic, coupled with Germanicus’ popularity in 
the city at large, supplies strong support for the rationale behind Tiberius’ jealousy. As a general 
who was very popular among a people who had yet to come to the realization that the 
governance of Rome had been significantly changed, G rmanicus still posed a threat to Tiberius’ 
supremacy. 
The narrator implicitly supports this reasoning with his use of the title Caesar. The use of 
the title for so many different individuals throughout the course of Annales 1-3, coupled with the 
similar frequency with which Tiberius and Germanicus receive it, suggests a conscious effort on 
Tacitus’ part to equate the power of the two men. This similarity of power, then, gives Tiberius a 
reason to be jealous of Germanicus, and that jealousy ultimately leads to Germanicus’ death. 
 
                                                 
22 Gowing 2005: 109-110: “…the Dialogus proposes an unprecedented rapprochement of Republican and imperial 
values that implies that the Republic is indeed ‘past.’ This conclusion is not new, of course – Seneca had already 
said as much…” For further discussion of the observance of the Republic as “past,” see Gowing chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 2: Tiberius’ Characteristic Jealousy 
 It is clear from his description of the relationship between Tiberius and Germanicus that 
Tacitus wants his reader to believe that Germanicus lost his life specifically due to Tiberius’ 
jealousy of him. Germanicus is not the only figure who becomes a target of Tiberius’ jealousy in 
the Annales, however. This jealousy, seemingly stemming from a lack of confidence in the 
security of his own position as princeps, is a characteristic of Tiberius’ that is found throughout 
the work’s early books. This jealousy is portrayed in a number of ways, which have been 
described thus by Ryberg: “Tacitus has created a very convincing impression of jealousy, 
treachery and crime, an impression built up by attribu ion of evil motives, by accusations put in 
the mouth of Germanicus, by quotation of statements from various individuals, by recounting of 
hearsay and rumors, and by later references which assume the truth of earlier implications” – in 
this chapter I will be discussing specific examples of attribution of evil motives, quotations from 
various individuals, recounting of hearsay, and references that assume the truth of earlier 
implications.23 In the Annales, Tiberius is characterized as feeling jealousy toward anybody in 
any sort of position of power, whether it be political, martial, or even social. This seems to be 
Tacitus’ way of demonstrating the impact that Tiberius’ reign had on the principate as an 
institution and thence on the military – from this point on, people in positions of influence find it 
in their best interests to restrain their fame, lest they incur the jealousy of the princeps. The 
examples that follow will illustrate that Germanicus’ demise was not a unique case during 
Tiberius’ principate. Further, the examples here will later be shown to have influenced the 
attitudes that later generations had toward the attitudes of their principes.  
                                                 
23 Ryberg 1942: 397 
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Piso’s Relationship with Tiberius 
 One of the more noteworthy targets of Tiberius’ jealousy is Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the 
alleged killer of Germanicus. His case is particularly notable in that before he is the target of 
Tiberius’ jealousy, he is (according to Tacitus) a tool that is used in the actions taken against a 
different target of Tiberius’ jealousy – Germanicus. When, after Germanicus has returned from 
Germany, Tiberius assigns Syria to him, the narrato mentions Piso’s appointment as the new 
governor of the province, replacing one Creticus Silanus. In the description of Piso’s succession 
to the governorship, the narrator mentions that Silanus was a marriage-connection of 
Germanicus. This bit of information, while it originally seems interesting and nothing more, 
appears to be part of Tacitus’ effort to put forth his opinion that Tiberius had replaced Silanus, a 
potential ally for Germanicus, with Piso specifically in order to hinder Germanicus.  
There are additional factors that make this idea much more likely. First, in the discussion 
of Silanus’ dismissal from the governorship of the province, no reason is given for why this 
happened: “but Tiberius removed Creticus Silanus, connected to Germanicus through marriage, 
from Syria… and he put Gnaeus Piso in charge” (s d Tiberius demoverat Syria Creticum 
Silanum, per adfinitatem conexum Germanico…praefeceratque Cn. Pisonem, 2.43.2). The lack 
of explanation here, coupled with the context in which this sentence is situated, would likely 
have caused Tacitus’ audience to wonder why exactly this had happened. The following sentence 
makes the replacement of Silanus with Piso seem even more questionable, when the narrator 
describes Piso as a man “violent in his temper and unaccustomed to obedience” (ingenio 
violentum et obsequii ignarum, 2.43.2). If it is not because of his affability or his ability as a 
subordinate that Tiberius put Piso in charge of Syria, then a more sinister motive becomes more 
likely. Tiberius’ overall distaste toward Germanicus throughout the Annales make the presence 
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of a sinister motive a very reasonable assumption. Further, Ryberg calls attention to the 
adversative sed that begins the statement, arguing that “the implication of hostile intent lies 
entirely in the adversative, which balances the two statements against each other” – although 
Tiberius did grant Germanicus a significant command, he balances this act out by putting Piso, a 
man who will act contrary to Germanicus’ best interests, in charge of the province.24 The three 
factors here described – Silanus’ connection to Germanicus, the absence of an attributed reason 
for his dismissal, and Piso’s negative character – make a fairly strong case for the narrator’s 
belief that Tiberius’ appointment of Piso was done sp cifically in order to hinder Germanicus.  
This idea is further supported by explicit discussion, put into the mouths of multiple 
characters, of the alliance between Tiberius and Piso. The first of these comes in the section of 
the work immediately following the one previously discussed. The narrator asserts that Piso “had 
no doubt that he had been chosen to be in charge of Syria in order to restrain Germanicus’ 
aspirations. Certain people believed that secret orders had even been given by Tiberius” (nec 
dubium habebat se delectum qui Syriae imponeretur ad spes Germanici coercendas. credidere 
quidam data et a Tiberio occulta mandata, 2.43.4). This sentiment is also expressed by the 
soldiery when, once Piso has arrived in Syria and bribery and a lack of discipline have begun to 
arise among the legions, “a secret rumor arose that these things were happening hardly against 
Tiberius’ will” (haud invito imperatore ea fieri occultus rumor incedebat, 2.55.6). And finally, 
once Germanicus has died and Piso is debating whether or not he should take control of Syria 
himself, one of his associates, advising a quick occupation of the province, reminds him that 
“you have the Augusta’s support, and Tiberius’ favor, though in secret” (‘est tibi Augustae 
                                                 
24 Ryberg 1942: 393 
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conscientia, est Caesaris favor, sed in occulto,’  2.77.3). So, whether or not it was in fact the 
case, multiple instances in Annales 2 make it clear that the narrator, through quotation of 
statements and recounting of rumors, wants his reade  to believe that Tiberius and Piso were 
conspiring against Germanicus. 
This secret alliance makes Piso’s downfall all the more surprising, at first glance. But 
after Germanicus has died and Piso has decided to take over Syria for his own, Piso is in a very 
similar position to the one Germanicus had been in: he was a man in a position of power with a 
band of loyal men supporting him. Though he was taking these actions (in his own opinion, at 
least) with Tiberius’ support, he had nonetheless become a potential threat to Tiberius’ position 
and had to be dealt with.  
After having been on trial for Germanicus’ murder for only one day, Piso is found dead 
in his bedroom, purportedly of a self-inflicted sword wound, about which the narrator leaves 
room for doubt by citing contemporary testimony: “I recall that I heard from some older men that 
he had not died of his own volition, but with an assassin sent after him” (Audire me memini ex 
senioribus…nec illum sponte exstinctum, verum immisso percussore, 3.16.1). In the Senatus 
Consultum de Cn. Pisone Patre, a preserved decree of the senate that describes the results of 
Piso’s trial, this death is described as a suicide undertaken to avoid a worse punishment: “the 
senate believes that he did not subject himself to the deserved punishment, but that he dragged 
himself away from a greater one, one which he understood was hanging over his head due to the 
pietas and severity of the judges” (arbitrari senatum non optulisse eum se debitae poenae, sed 
maiori et quam imminere sibi ab pietate et severitate iudicantium intellegebat subtraxisse, SCPP 
71-73). That Piso was guilty of Germanicus’ murder, we can now know for a certainty, was the 
official position of the Roman senate. 
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However, even with Piso out of the way, Tacitus’ Tiber us continues to be paranoid about 
what this man’s actions were doing to his own reputation. The first words attributed to Tiberius 
after Piso’s death are not ones of relief over a threat removed, but of worry about what the man’s 
manner of death might have accomplished: “Ill-will toward me among the senate was sought 
with such a death…” (suam invidiam tali morte quaesitam apud senatum, 3.16.2). This is not the 
first time in the Annales that Tiberius feels paranoia about the sympathy aroused amongst the 
Roman populace by a dead man. He also expresses som feelings of discomfort about the Roman 
people’s attitude toward Germanicus after his death. These feelings are implied in the narrator’s 
discussion of Tiberius’ attitude toward Germanicus’ widow Agrippina. 
 
Tiberius’ Treatment of Germanicus’ Family 
Agrippina also incurs Tiberius’ jealousy after Germanicus’ death, due to the fact that 
Germanicus’ popularity among the Roman people seems to have been transferred to her: 
“nothing bothered Tiberius more than the people’s burning zeal for Agrippina, when they were 
calling her the glory of Rome, the sole blood of Augustus, a unique model of the past” (nihil 
tamen Tiberium magis penetravit quam studia hominum accensa in Agrippinam, cum decus 
patriae, solum Augusti sanguinem, unicum antiquitatis specimen appellarent, 3.4.2). While the 
zeal for Agrippina is Tiberius’ primary concern here, the magis…quam, lacking anything to 
which it is comparing the studia (being compared to literally nothing, nihil), implies that the 
popularity of the dead Germanicus among the people continues to affect Tiberius. What unites 
the popularities of Germanicus and Agrippina is the fact that they both have associations with the 
Julian family; as discussed above, Germanicus’ independent association to the Julian line can be 
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seen as a factor in Tiberius’ attitude toward him. If this is the case, then Agrippina’s marital 
relation to the Julian line, as well as the blood-relation to the Julians that her children enjoyed, 
surely would have continued to bother Tiberius. 
An allusion to Sallust’s Bellum Iugurthinum throws Tiberius’ sensitivity about 
Agrippina’s popularity into a negative light as well. In the early chapters of the Bellum 
Iugurthinum, Sallust describes Jugurtha’s uncle Micipsa as afraid of “the Numidians’ burning 
zeal for Jugurtha” (studia Numidarum in Iugurtham accensa, 6.3). The contexts in which this 
quotation and Tacitus’ studia hominum accensa in Agrippinam re found are very similar.25 Both 
describe an absolute ruler (Tiberius or Micipsa) feeling concerned about his peoples’ strong 
enthusiasm for another (Agrippina or Jugurtha). However, Micipsa’s fear is warranted, as 
Jugurtha soon wrests control of Numidia from his half-brothers, while Tiberius’ fear of 
Agrippina, who has taken no threatening actions against Tiberius nor, arguably, is she described 
as doing so in the entirety of the Annales, is proven to be unwarranted. Further, the Latin itself is 
identical but for the placement of the phrase in Iugurtham/in Agrippinam, and before Tacitus the 
use of the structure “studium in aliquem accensum” is found only in Sallust.26 It seems 
purposeful that the one change that Tacitus makes from Sallust’s phrasing causes Agrippina’s 
name to end up in the emphatic final position. This placement of Agrippina’s name could surely 
be intended to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that while Micipsa’s concern is directed 
toward Jugurtha, Tiberius’ concern is directed toward a woman. The juxtaposition of Jugurtha, 
who took control of the entirety of Numidia, with Agrippina, a woman who never comes into any 
legitimate power, makes Tiberius’ jealousy seem even more ridiculous. 
                                                 
25 Koestermann 1963 cites this similarity with no comment. 
26 According to a search from the Phi disk. 
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Tacitus’ reliance on Sallust throughout his work, most famously represented in the 
Annales by the similarity between its opening sentence (urbem Romam a principio reges 
habuere, 1.1.1) and the preface of Sallust’s Bellum Catilinae (urbem Romam, sicut ego accepi, 
condidere atque habuere initio Troiani, 6.1), lends further strength to the likelihood this 
allusion.27 This allusion, then, coupled with the fact that Agrippina takes no seriously threatening 
actions against Tiberius in the narrative of the Annales, suggests to the reader that Tiberius’ 
sensitivity about Agrippina’s popularity is yet another sign of his now-characteristic jealousy. 
Germanicus and Agrippina’s eldest son Nero also suffers the ill effects of Tiberius’ 
jealousy. His popularity among the Roman people was equal to his mother’s, as shown by the 
narrator’s description of the Roman people’s prayers: “turned to the sky and the gods, they 
prayed that [Agrippina’s] son be safe and sound, an outlive his enemies” (versique ad caelum 
ac deos integram illi subolem ac superstitem iniquorum precarentur, 3.4.2). His position as the 
successor to Tiberius’ office made him even more of a threat. Thus, he was vehemently 
mistreated by Sejanus, as described most fully in An ales 4: 
Sejanus simulated the role of a judge against the offspring of Germanicus, with 
men subordinated to him who would take up the duty of informants and would 
attack Nero in particular, as the next in line for succession. …Defiant and ill-
advised words would come [from Nero] and, when the guards near him reported 
them, having taken note and exaggerated them, no chance was given to Nero to 
defend himself; …whether the young man spoke or was silent, he was faulted for 
his silence or his speech. 
                                                 
27 For further discussion on Tacitus’ reliance upon Sallust, see Woodman 1992 and Krebs 2012. 
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adsimulabatque [Seianus] iudicis partes adversum Germanici stirpem, subditis 
qui accusatorum nomina sustinerent maximeque insectarentur Neronem 
proximum successioni. …voces procedebant contumaces et inconsultae, quas 
adpositi custodes exceptas auctasque cum deferrent neque Neroni defendere 
daretur; …seu loqueretur seu taceret iuvenis, crimen ex silentio, ex voce. (4.59.3-
60.2) 
Though all of these actions taken against Nero are att ibuted to Sejanus’ agency, the passage 
immediately preceding this one suggests Tiberius’ awareness of these efforts, if not his outright 
complicity.  
The passage that precedes this section describes Sejanus’ selfless effort to save Tiberius’ 
life while they were dining in a villa that was situated inside of a natural cave. During the meal, 
the roof of the cave collapsed and Sejanus propped himself up over Tiberius in order to protect 
him from any falling debris. Because of this event, the narrator claims, Sejanus was trusted more 
fully by Tiberius from that point on, no matter what course of action he advised (maior ex eo, et 
quamquam exitiosa suaderet, ut non sui anxius, cum fide audiebatur, 4.59.2). The very next 
words of this section are the ones quoted above in the description of Nero’s mistreatment at 
Sejanus’ hands. The placement of this anecdote here se ms to suggest Tacitus’ efforts to 
convince his reader that though Sejanus was the one orch strating these deeds, Tiberius had 
approved of them. Bowen very accurately summarizes this phenomenon: “Tiberius also 
permitted Sejanus to exercise other forms of tyranny i  his political prosecutions and executions, 
and thus by silent compliance more than overt act con ributed to make his principate odious in 
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the memory of the Roman people…what an absolute ruler permits through his minister he 
performs in fact.”28 
A description of Tiberius later in Annales 4.60 also lends credence to this argument. After 
further description of the way that Nero was being treated throughout the entire city, Tiberius is 
described as “harsh, or falsely smiling” (torvus aut falsum renidens vultu, 4.60.2). His lack of 
empathy about Nero’s plight (shown by torvus), or his deceptively encouraging attitude (falsum 
renidens) both suggest that Tiberius also had a hand in Nero’s suffering. Thus we see again, just 
as in Agrippina’s case, a member of Germanicus’ family being mistreated due to Germanicus’ 
enduring popularity. The original reason given by the narrator for Sejanus’ actions is the fact that 
Nero is next in line for the succession. That fact, coupled with the surviving popularity of 
Germanicus’ family, made him an ideal target for Tiber us as well. In addition to furthering his 
characterization of Tiberius as cold and calculating, these instances serve to further another of 
Tacitus’ goals in Annales 4, namely blackening the character of Sejanus. 
 
Tiberius and Drusus 
There is another story in Annales 4 that casts a negative light upon Sejanus and Tiberius’ 
relationship. After describing the death of Tiberius’ son Drusus in the manner described by the 
“most numerous, and reliable, authors” (plurimis maximaeque fidei auctoribus, 4.10.1), the 
narrator relates a second account of Drusus’ death. The narrator’s reason for including this story 
is that he does not believe such a telling  rumor (validum) should be left out of his account of 
Drusus’ death (sed non omiserim eorundem temporum rumorem, validum adeo, ut nondum 
                                                 
28 Bowen 1913: 165 
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exolescat, 4.10.1). The word validus being used to describe a rumor in Tacitus is a quite unusual 
occurrence – though rumor is certainly a favorite word of his (it is used 73 times in Agricola, 
Historiae, and Annales), this is only one of two instances in which its description has a degree of 
positivity.29 The one other example deserves mention, given its context. The marriage of 
Germanicus’ son Nero and Drusus’ daughter Julia was received with favorable talk (secundo 
rumore), but that talk was tempered by the fact that through that marriage, Sejanus was going to 
become part of the Julio-Claudian family – this, the people thought, was both a defilement of the 
nobility of the family and also an example of Sejanus’ excessive expectations (utque haec 
secundo rumore, ita adversis animis acceptum, quod fili  Claudii socer Seianus destinaretur. 
polluisse nobilitatem familiae videbatur suspectumqe iam nimiae spei Seianum ultra extulisse, 
3.29.4). As this is the only other example of the word rumor being described with any degree of 
positivity, the possibility of the connection between the two episodes should be explored. While 
this example depicts a rumor whose positivity is tarnished and the other example is of a negative 
rumor described with a positive adjective, the original positivity of the rumor disappears because 
of Sejanus’ presence in both cases. Surely a reader f miliar with Tacitus would pause upon 
finding the word rumor qualified with a favorable modifier, only to then realize that that rare 
positivity was shortly done away with by Sejanus. 
In the rumor’s version of Drusus’ death, Sejanus warns Tiberius that the first cup that his 
son will offer him at the night’s festivities will be poisoned, thereby accusing Drusus of plotting 
against his father’s life (Drusum veneni in patrem arguens, 4.10.2), though it was actually 
through his own agency that the cup had been poisoned. Tiberius, characteristically paranoid 
                                                 
29 Nearly every instance of rumor in Tacitus is followed by a negative or, at best, a neutral adjective. Examples run 
from constans, creber, and varius to falsus, spernendus, and atrox.  
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about losing his life at the hand of somebody striving after his position as princeps, believes 
Sejanus and, when offered the cup later that evening, hands it back to Drusus. Drusus, having 
taken the cup from his father, unwittingly drinks the poison. Tiberius, finding a way to construe 
this sign of Drusus’ innocence into evidence of a crime, believes that “out of fear and shame he 
had brought the death that he had prepared for his father upon himself” (metu et pudore sibimet 
inrogaret mortem, quam patri struxerat, 4.10.3). Thus, according to this version of events, 
Tiberius willingly allows his son to die, believing that he would otherwise have died himself.  
The narrator argues quite strongly against the possibility of this story being true, but his 
explanation of the reason that it was so widely believ d seems to very much align with his own 
beliefs about Tiberius: “But because Sejanus was con idered the fashioner of all wicked deeds, 
from Caesar’s excessive care for him and everybody else’s hatred of them both, these things, 
however unbelievable and extreme, were believed” (sed quia Seianus facinorum omnium 
repertor habebatur, ex nimia caritate in eum Caesaris et ceterorum in utrumque odio quamvis 
fabulosa et immania credebantur, 4.11.2). Now although the narrator purportedly reports this 
story in order to do away with such an absurd rumor (ut claro sub exemplo falsas auditiones 
depellerem, 4.11.3), the level of detail afforded to the description of the story’s believability 
seems unnecessary. Ryberg concurs that rumors are often included for reasons beyond those 
given, citing this specific scene as one of Tacitus’ “several methods of escaping the onus of 
bringing charges against Tiberius without lessening the impression of his guilt.”30 This seems 
clearly to be what the narrator is doing here – by bringing up this story, whether or not he openly 
                                                 
30 Ryberg 1942: 386-7 
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agrees with it, he has alerted the reader to the fact th t this story had circulated throughout the 
city at the time of the event. 
Certainly the fact that the first version of the story is paralleled in the “most numerous, 
and reliable, authors” (plurimis maximaeque fidei auctoribus, 4.10.1) would normally be proof 
enough of its accuracy. In Annales 3, when discussing the attendance of Germanicus’ funeral, the 
narrator refers to his mother’s absence. Because her name is not found anywhere in the historians 
(apud auctores rerum, 3.3.2), the narrator takes it as a given that she was not in attendance and 
proceeds to postulate reasons for her absence. Why, then, since the historians (auctoribus) agree 
that his first telling of the death of Drusus is the correct one, would the narrator bother to tell the 
second version? It seems more than plausible to assume that the narrator included this story just 
for its negative description of Tiberius and Sejanus’ actions. It would certainly not be the first 
time that the narrator has looked to attack their character, nor will it be the last. Whether or not 
the narrator’s sole intention is to draw attention t  the negativity of this relationship, the fact that 
this story was believable enough to survive to Tacitus’ time further indicates the level of 
notoriety that Tiberius’ jealousy experienced. 
 
Tiberius and the Military 
Tiberius’ family members are not the only people who feel the effects of his jealousy, 
however. The military, as an institution, suffers under the restraint of Tiberius’ jealous actions as 
well. After describing the influx of men to the cause of Tacfarinas, a deserter from the Roman 
army who was leading his fellow Africans against Roman rule, the narrator informs the reader 
that “Caesar, after the achievements of Blaesus, as if there were no longer enemies in Africa, 
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ordered that the Ninth legion be recalled” (Caesar post res a Blaeso gestas, quasi nullis iam in 
Africa hostibus, reportari nonam legionem iusserat, 4.23.2). This sentence drips with sarcasm, 
especially noticeable when read in the light of a comment of the narrator’s made earlier, in 
Annales 3. In his description of the aforementioned r s a Blaeso gestas, the narrator makes these 
comments: “Once [Tacfarinas’] brother was captured, Blaesus withdrew, but earlier than was 
useful for his allies, as he had left behind those through whom the war could be renewed” (fratre 
eius capto regressus est, properantius tamen quam ex utilitate sociorum relictis per quos 
resurgeret bellum, 3.74.3). The final clause is particularly important to this analysis: the men 
who had the capacity to renew the war, among whom was the leader of the entire rebellion, 
Tacfarinas, had neither been captured nor defeated – hey had been left in Africa. But even at this 
point, Tiberius construes the war as completed (pro confecto interpretatus, 3.74.4) and rewards 
Blaesus for his achievement. This earlier comment upon the war in Africa, coupled with the 
comment quasi nullis iam in Africa hostibus in the quote at hand, stand as strong evidence that 
Tiberius was knowingly recalling soldiers from Africa before the conflict had been settled. 
Why, though, would the narrator portray Tiberius as purposely recalling soldiers from a 
war that was not completed? The motivation for such an action is found in the final chapter of 
Annales 4. In the year 28 CE, the Romans suffer a loss of approximately 1300 soldiers at the 
hands of a German tribe called the Frisians. When tis information is reported to Tiberius, he 
purposely keeps it from the Roman people, specifically so that he not have to allot a command to 
anybody  (dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum permitteret, 4.74.1). This motivation, then, 
can also be retroactively applied to Tiberius’ recalling of troops from Africa – a clear example of 
Ryberg’s “later references which assume the truth of earlier implication.” As the narrator 
provides no strategic reason why Tiberius might have t ken such an action, the circumstances 
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strongly suggest to the reader that Tiberius was acting to make sure nobody received a command 
in Africa.31 What we see here, then, is the narrator specifically iting Tiberius’ jealousy as a 
motivation for an action that he takes, where previously the motivation would only have been 
implied. 
In addition to Tiberius’ jealousy prompting him to take actions that hinder men whom he 
believes could become a threat to his position, there are also instances in the Annales of Tiberius 
rewarding men or celebrating their achievements specifically because he does not see them as 
threatening. A specific example of this habit is Furius Camillus: 
For after the preserver of the city and his son Camillus, military praise had been 
among other families, and this Camillus whom we mention was considered 
inexperienced in war. For this reason, Tiberius more readily celebrated his 
achievements at the senate; and the senators decree to him an honorary triumph, 
which was not harmful to Camillus on account of the modesty of his life. 
nam post illum reciperatorem urbis filiumque eius Camillum penes alias familias 
imperatoria laus fuerat, atque hic, quem memoramus, bellorum expers habebatur. 
eo pronior Tiberius res gestas apud senatum celebravit; et decrevere patres 
triumphalia insignia, quod Camillo ob modestiam vitae impune fuit. (2.52.5) 
Here we see two separate condemnations of Tiberius’ reign. The first of these is the fact that 
Tiberius was more ready to celebrate a man’s achievem nts specifically due to the fact that his 
                                                 
31 Furneaux 1896 suggests that “it is equally probable that Tiberius did not think the territory worth the pains of such 
reconquest; still more so that this is merely an insta ce of the disinclination to effort which marks hi later years” 
(576). The evidence cited in this paper about Tiberius’ previous actions concerning Africa, though, make  strong 
case for a less neutral motive. 
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family had fallen out of renown. This could be seen as a positive – celebrating the resurgence of 
an old family’s name is certainly a praiseworthy action to take. To fully understand how far out 
of renown it was necessary for a family to fall in order for Tiberius to be comfortable celebrating 
its achievements, though, one must realize that “tht well-known preserver of the city” (illum 
reciperatorem urbis) was not a man who had operated at the time of Marius nd Sulla, who had 
lived over a century previous, but one who had led the utter destruction of the city of Veii in 396 
B.C.E. and had driven off the Gallic army that had s cked Rome in 390, earning himself the 
nickname “the second founder of the city” (conditorque alter urbis, Livy 5.49.7). Thus the 
narrator implies that in order for Tiberius to celebrate a man’s achievements, his family must 
only have been in obscurity for 400 years.  
The final clause of this section further shows thatTiberius’ reason for this celebration 
was less than positive. This sentence, which asserts tha  Camillus’ reception of an honorary 
triumph was harmless only because he did not live a not ble life (ob modestiam vitae), also 
strongly implies that if he had lived a more notable life, Camillus would have been punished for 
receiving an honorary triumph. This, then, puts forth a picture of Tiberius as a ruler who 
celebrates the achievements of those who were not previously well-known, but punishes the 
achievements of those who already had some renown. 
 
Conclusion 
Two of the more notable examples of men being punished for their renown are those of 
Gaius Silius and Titius Sabinus. The decision to atack these two men is prompted by Tiberius’ 
realization that, due to his own old age, the younger generation of statesmen is beginning to 
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receive increased attention from the Roman populace. From this realization, and Sejanus’ 
obvious encouragement (instabat quippe Seianus), comes Tiberius’ decision to topple one or two 
of the most well-known men (unus alterve maxime prompti subverterentur, 4.17.3). This is yet 
another example of the narrator’s negative characteriza ion of the relationship between Tiberius 
and Sejanus. The adverb quippe demonstrates to the reader that not only was Sejanus the one 
who encouraged Tiberius to take these actions, but he was obviously the one who did this 
encouraging – this has become characteristic enough f Sejanus that we should no longer be 
surprised when he encourages such negative actions. From the perspective of Tiberius’ actions, 
we see the narrator specifically attributing this behavior to jealousy for the first time in the 
narrative – he relates Germanicus’ death only uncertainly to Tiberius, Piso’s trial and subsequent 
death are attributed to his revolutionary actions in Syria, and the mistreatment of Nero is 
officially attributed to Sejanus alone. But here thnarrator explicitly blames Tiberius’ jealousy 
for his actions: “For this reason [his age and the people’s partiality toward his younger relatives], 
he went after C. Silius and Titius Sabinus” (qua causa C. Silium et Titium Sabinum adgreditur, 
4.18.1). Just as with Sejanus’ actions, it seems, the narrator has now seen enough examples of 
Tiberius’ involvement in these sorts of actions that e no longer tempers these stories with any 
other explanations – he now confidently asserts that jealousy was the motivating factor behind 
these actions. 
These examples represent the effect that Tiberius’ jealous nature had on different areas of 
Roman society. While the reason for this jealousy – apprehension that somebody more renowned 
than himself might wrest his position away from him – is relatively clear, the source of the 
apprehension has not yet been discussed. Aside from a possible innate tendency toward paranoia, 
another possible explanation is found early in Annales 1. Upon Augustus’ death, Tacitus presents 
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a sample of the sorts of things that were possibly being said about him among the people. One of 
the less-glowing appraisals of his character runs thu : “He did not even choose Tiberius as his 
successor out of affection or concern for the republic, ut, since he had observed [Tiberius’] 
arrogance and brutality, he sought glory for himself through a very unfavorable comparison” (e 
Tiberium quidem caritate aut rei publicae cura successorem adscitum, sed, quoniam 
adrogantiam saevitiamque eius introspexerit, comparatione deterrima sibi gloriam quaesivisse, 
1.10.7). Now, if this rumor had found its way to Tiberius, he surely would have felt some 
pressure to be the most outstanding man in Rome. If for no other reason, what Shotter 
characterizes as Tiberius’ “near-obsessive attitude o the dead Augustus” would have compelled 
Tiberius to demonstrate that this accusation was false.32 Even the implication that people 
believed that he had been chosen specifically due to his negative attributes could certainly have 
motivated him to prove them wrong. If, then, this were the case, we can safely assert that the 
narrator wants this to seem to be a motivating factor behind his jealous behavior – his attacking 
of popular and powerful men, his readiness to praise men who were of relatively low status, and 
his reluctance to give anybody an opportunity for further glory would all be very effective means 
of guaranteeing that he retain his status as the most pr minent man in Rome.  
Tiberius’ characteristic jealousy is not something that the people who lived in Tiberius’ 
reign are described by the narrator as being unaware of – in the case of Gaius Silius, the 
correlation between his greatness and his downfall was understood. Our narrator tells us that 
“from however greater a height he fell, that much more fear was scattered among others” (quanto 
maiore mole procideret, plus formidinis in alios dipergebatur, 4.18.1). Because this event took 
                                                 




place so early in Tiberius’ reign (he rules for thirteen more years after this event), there was 
surely enough time for the Roman people’s attitude about gaining fame to be inexorably 
changed. Living under a princeps who was so averse to anybody achieving any level of 
significance, Tacitus seems to believe that the Romans would naturally have adapted their 
behavior in order to survive and checked their own aspirations for renown. The roller-coaster 
ride of a principate that was the reign of Gaius Caligula would have done nothing to change this 
attitude. However, the ever-present grief that the Romans are described as having felt about the 
death of their beloved Germanicus surely would have caused them to realize that he was one of 
the earliest casualties of Tiberius’ jealousy. Thus, Tacitus asserts that Germanicus’ example 
would have stood out in the minds of any aspiring generals for the rest of the principate and 
caused them to think twice about the level of fame that they were reaching, as can be seen in his 












Chapter 3: Nero’s Principate, and Corbulo 
 While the gap in the text of the Annales after the Tiberian books hinders us from 
observing the course of development of the new “imperial” style of generalship, the finished 
product is readily observable in the Claudian and Neronian books. Germanicus, pressing his 
advantage and continuing his campaigns across a span of many years, is no longer the model 
upon which these generals base their behavior – far from it. The narrator describes two new 
types of general in the Claudian and Neronian books: the first achieves a significant level of 
success, but is shortly thereafter deprived of his command in some way; the second is one who is 
very rarely, if ever, described as making a campaign gainst an enemy for more than a single 
year, and whose main focus is no longer achieving a crushing military victory over his 
adversaries. These generals often do just enough to earn an honorary triumph (which I will show 
is described by Tacitus as having become exceedingly common and therefore noticeably less 
significant), and then merely hold on to their command as quietly as possible. The one exception 
to these trends as described by Tacitus is Domitius Corbulo, who is found consistently 
succeeding on the battlefield during four of the final six books of the Annales. 
 
Pushing the Limits of Prominence 
  This first sort, the general who becomes noteworthy and then is deprived of his 
command, is only represented with one specific example in the Claudian and Neronian books of 
the Annales, but the idea that excessive glory is not something that a general should strive for is 
more generally expressed on several occasions. The one specific example of a victorious general 
being summarily removed from his position is Suetonius Paulinus, governor of Britain, who is 
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described by the narrator as “Corbulo’s competitor in knowledge of strategy and talk of the 
people” (scientia militiae et rumore populi…Corbulonis concertator, 14.29.2). After several 
smaller victories throughout the province, Paulinus wins a decisive victory against the army of 
Boudicca, in which, the narrator reports, “some say” (qui…tradant, 14.37.2) no fewer than 
80,000 Britons fell, with only 400 fallen Romans.  
 Nero was quickly informed of this victory, as it was no small affair, and a court freedman 
was shortly sent to assess the situation in Britain. After the freedman’s report is sent back to 
Rome, Paulinus is relieved of command. The reason that is attributed to this removal is the fact 
that Paulinus “had lost a few ships on the shore, and the rowers with them” (quod paucas naves 
in litore remigiumque in iis amiserat, 14.39.3). This seems a harsh punishment, especially g ven 
the significance of the victory that Paulinus had just achieved over Boudicca’s army.  
 The narrator suggests, in multiple ways in this pasage, that he also believes that this 
punishment is harsh. The first of these ways is simply the use of the adjective paucas to describe 
the number of ships that Paulinus had lost: the primary definition of this word is “only a small 
number” (OCD 1). If this is indeed the shade of meaning that the author intended with the use of 
this word, then we can safely assume at least some level of criticism, as if this were too small a 
number of losses to have warranted such a punishment.33  
 Secondly, the praise that Suetonius gained from this victory is described as on par with 
those of old (antiquis victoriis par ea die laus parta, 14.37.2). Just as Germanicus’ “republican” 
style of military command was shown in previous chapters to have elicited Tiberius’ jealousy, 
                                                 
33 Furneaux 1908, in describing Paulinus’ dismissal, also believes that the punishment was excessive, saying that 
“soon afterwards a trifling disaster was made the occasion for this to be done” (Furneaux 283). 
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Suetonius’ victory here, similar to that of his famous predecessors, can be seen as eliciting the 
same response from Nero. The narrator’s description of his praise as antiquis victoriis par, then, 
should be read as his effort to draw attention to the notion that the motivation behind Nero’s 
dismissal of Suetonius, in the narrator’s opinion, was the same as the motivation that caused 
Tiberius to react so jealously toward Germanicus’ victories – he did not believe that Suetonius 
was no longer deserving of an army, but he was jealous of his success and needed to remove him 
from a situation in which he could achieve more. 
 An additional suggestion of the narrator’s opinion about the severity of this punishment 
comes in his description of the order itself: “Suetonius [Paulinus] is ordered to hand over his 
army to Petronius Turpilianus, as if the war were continuing” (Suetonius…tamquam durante 
bello tradere exercitum Petronio Turpiliano…iubetur, 14.39.3). The ablative absolute tamquam 
durante bello seems to make the narrator’s opinion much more clear than his use of the adjective 
paucas. The adversative sense of the conjunction amquam effectively means that whatever 
follows (here, durante bello) is contrary to what is actually the case.34 This means that the 
narrator believes that the war had ended, and that it d been ended at Paulinus’ hands. The fact 
that he had successfully quelled a rebellion and won a war seems more than enough reason to 
leave a general at the head of his army. Further, t adversative sense of tamquam suggests some 
level of mockery in the description of this order: if the war were continuing, then this would be 
an order that one would expect to hear, but because the war is over, it does not make much sense.  
                                                 
34 Though no finite verb is present, through which the specific shade of meaning of tamquam could be ascertained, 
Woodcock 1984 translates tamquam durante bello as “on the excuse that a state of war continued,” citing it as the 
normal use of tamquam with a participle (126). Furneaux 1908 additionally reads tamquam this way: “i.e. the loss of 
some ships, probably by some piratical attack, was taken as evidence that, after all, the state of war still existed and 
that Suetonius was not capable of restoring peace” (283). 
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 The specific language used in the description of Paulinus’ loss of his army suggests that 
the narrator believed that his removal was not deserv d, and the description of Paulinus’ 
successor suggests that the narrator believed his pun hment was due to his success. After 
Paulinus is ordered to hand over his army, the narrator says that Turpilianus “without provoking 
the enemy, nor harassed himself, placed the honorable n me of ‘peace’ upon slothful laziness” 
(non inritato hoste neque lacessitus honestum pacis nomen segni otio imposuit, 14.39.3). The 
contrast between honestum pacis nomen a d segni otio casts Turpilianus’ personality in a very 
negative light. Further, in a province in which a wr had very recently been quelled, replacing a 
wildly successful general with a lazy one strongly suggests that the motivation behind the choice 
of Turpilianus as successor to the governorship was to ensure that no more military glory was 
won in Britain.  
 The idea that Paulinus was removed from his command due to Nero’s opposition to other 
men being successful is supported by a comment made by the narrator in the previous book. 
Discussing the lack of campaigning being performed by the German legions, he reports that “a 
rumor arose that the right to campaign against the enemy had been taken away from the 
generals” (fama incessit ereptum ius legatis ducendi in hostem, 13.54.1). Read in light of the 
episode of Paulinus’ dismissal in the following book, this rumor gains some credibility. Though 
asserting that the generals had been forbidden to campaign might be a bit strong, the claim that 
they were discouraged from doing so certainly finds credence here. If campaigning had been 
discouraged, then Paulinus’ removal from his positin, no matter what the outcome of his 
expedition might have been, now has at least some se blance of an explanation. 
 Further, more general comments on the dangers of succe s are found throughout the 
Neronian books of the Annales. In narrating a story of Thrasea Paetus interpreting an insult of 
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Nero against him as a sign of his imminent death, the narrator comments that “glory and danger 
were increasing for outstanding men” (gloria egregiis viris et pericula gliscebant, 15.23.4). This 
comment in particular signals the narrator’s belief in a change in the status quo between the 
republic and the principate – two words that had previously been nothing but positive, gloria and 
egregius, now go hand-in-hand with periculum. This association between gloria and periculum is 
made even stronger in light of the observation that t e two words make up a virtual hendiadys 
(i.e., instead of “glory and danger,” they could be translated as “the danger that arises from 
glory”). Thus, according to the narrator, the principate is no longer safe for outstanding men. 
 The Roman people espouse this same sentiment much earlier in the work. Commenting 
upon the success in Germany of Corbulo, the people lam nt: “Why stir up the enemy? It’s going 
to turn out badly for Rome; but if he is successful, an outstanding man endangers peace and is 
grievous to a cowardly emperor” (cur hostem conciret? adversa in rem publicam casura; sin 
prospere egisset, formidolosum paci virum insignem et ignavo principi praegravem, 11.19.3). 
The juxtaposition here of formidolosum with insignem, just like that of gloria and egregiis with 
periculum above, points out the altered state of affairs under the principate – the same traits that 
were once wholly positive under the republic now bring danger upon the men who embody them. 
The people even take their critique a step further t an the narrator, in that they 
specifically blame the danger of prosperity on the princeps and on the implication that he is 
afraid of successful men. Malloch points out that te juxtaposition of a nameless virum insignem 
and ignavo principi takes this statement beyond a critique of just the relationship between 
Corbulo and (here) Claudius, but makes it more a critique of that between the viri insignes and 
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principes of the entire first century C.E.35 He cites in support of this feeling passages from b th 
Sallust and Livy that echo the sentiment – the distance between the time periods in which these 
authors were writing is evidence that this feeling is not being falsely attributed to the Roman 
people by Tacitus, as it was expressed by authors over the course of well over a century.36 
Tacitus himself had earlier expressed this sentiment in the Agricola, in which he, discussing 
Agricola’s successes in Britain, says that “this was most dangerous to him, that the name of a 
private citizen be lifted up above that of the princeps” ( id sibi maxime formidolosum, privati 
hominis nomen supra principem adtolli, Agr. 39.2). While the prevalence of this sentiment 
throughout Roman literature of different time periods could suggest that this case is no different 
than that of, for instance, the jealous men to whom Sallust and Livy refer, it is the position of 
princeps that makes his case special. Tiberius was the first example since the inception of the 
Roman republic of somebody who was both inherently a jealous person and also in a position of 
power for a long enough time that the effects of his jealousy could become manifest. During the 
entirety of the republic, no matter how inherently jealous a man was, it was only for one-year 
periods (with a minimum of a ten-year break in between) that he was truly in a position in which 
the results of that jealousy could become manifest. But with the rise of the principate, men were 
suddenly placed in positions of significant power, sometimes for decades – this was more than 
enough time for their jealousy to have had an effect on the collective psyche of their 
constituencies. 
                                                 
35 Malloch 2013: 287 
36 Sall. Catil. 7.2: regibus boni quam mali suspectiores sunt semperque eis aliena virtus formidulosa est; Liv. 
35.43.1: nulla ingenia tam prona ad invidiam sunt quam eorum qui genus ac fortunam suam animis non aequant, 
quia virtutem et bonum alienum oderunt. 
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 The result of this belief of the Roman people thate princeps is frightened of successful 
men is displayed later in the narrative. When Lucius Vetus, the leader of the German legions, 
considers enacting a plan that would cause him to lead his army into territories other than the one 
allotted to him, the governor of Belgica, Aelius Gracilis, is described as warning him not to 
follow through with his idea, advising that “he should not lead legions into another’s province 
and aim for popularity in Gaul, insisting that this was alarming to the emperor, and that 
honorable pursuits are often deterred for this reason” (ne legiones alienae provinciae inferret 
studiaque Galliarum adfectaret, formidolosum id imperatori dictitans, quo plerumque 
prohibentur conatus honesti, 13.53.3). A general leading an army into another man’s province 
for reasons of aggression could very reasonably be considered formidolosum to any person 
operating in the Roman government – Vetus’ intentions, however, were far from aggressive. His 
plan, as described by the narrator, was to connect th  major rivers of the region with canals, in 
order that freight could make its way farther inland from the sea (13.53.2). The fact that the 
governor of a province is seriously advising a general against a plan like this – entirely harmless, 
and objectively very useful to the Roman army – illustrates exactly what the Roman generals 
thought of their position in the principate. Gracilis’ reaction suggests that, in his mind, the 
possibility of upsetting the princeps was so great that a Roman general had no choice but to 
command his army as quietly as possible.  
 
Avoiding Prominence 
 This necessity of quietude in leading one’s army explains the narrator’s descriptions of 
many of the generals in the later books of the Annales. Helvidius Priscus, for example, is called 
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upon to settle the potentially-turbulent situation n Syria. He achieves his goal in settling things, 
but the narrator comments upon the way in which he achieved this result: “he settled the matter 
more through moderation than force…in an effort not to stir up the beginning of a war with the 
Parthians” (moderatione plura quam vi composuerat…ne initium belli adversus Parthos 
existeret, 12.49.2). The fact that the narrator goes out of his way to describe Helvidius as having 
acted “more through moderation than force” seems to suggest that this method of settling the 
situation was something relatively novel to the style of generalship described in the prior books 
of the Annales, and warranted explanation – if acting with more moderation than force had been 
usual operating procedure for a general up until that time, it would not have required comment. 
The description of his acting “in an effort not to stir up the beginning of a war with the 
Parthians” further illustrates the novelty of his style. One previous noteworthy general in the 
Annales, Germanicus, surely never acted in a way to specifically avoid a war – in fact, when he 
is asked to abandon his war against the Germans, he begs Tiberius to allow him to campaign for 
one final year (2.26, discussed in a previous chapter).  
 Another example of a general avoiding a war is Petronius Turpilianus, who was chosen to 
replace Suetonius Paulinus in Britain. The narrator here describes his style of generalship a bit 
more harshly than that of Helvidius. As discussed above, the narrator’s description of 
Turpilianus as putting the “honorable name of ‘peace’ upon slothful laziness” (honestum pacis 
nomen segni otio, 14.39.3) shows his very low opinion not only of Turpilianus, but of the way 
that the institution of generalship was being handled under the principate. 
 A general avoiding any type of renown while out in h s province is not the only sort 
described by the narrator as having emerged from the principate, however. There are also a 
number of generals who are described as having gained renown to a certain degree before they 
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settled down and focused on cultivating peace. The point at which many of these generals deem 
their renown enough is when they have earned an honorary triumph. The narrator, while 
discussing the lack of conflict in Germany, describes his opinion about honorary triumphs: 
“because honorary triumphs were commonplace, [generals] were hoping for greater glory if they 
maintained peace” (qui pervulgatis triumphi insignibus maius ex eo decus sperabant, si pacem 
continuavissent, 13.53.1).37 What the narrator seems to be implying here is that the honorary 
triumph, a military honor, has become so common that a general no longer needed to take any 
actual military action to earn one. He describes throughout the later books of the Annales the 
sorts of things that were deemed worthy of honorary triumphs, and often seems to emphasize 
how little these generals actually did. 
 The first example of one of these honorary triumphs, ironically, belongs to Corbulo. 
While building a fort in the territory of the Germans against whom he was campaigning, Corbulo 
is ordered to withdraw his troops. He does so, and his following actions are described thus:  
In order that the soldiers cast off their laziness, [Corbulo] had them dig a canal, 
twenty-three miles long, between the Meuse and the Rhine, by which the 
uncertainties of the ocean could be avoided. Nevertheless, Caesar bestowed upon 
him an honorary triumph, although he had denied him a war.  
                                                 
37 Furneaux 1908 cites this passage, along with 11.20.5 and 12.3.2 as examples of the “prodigality” with w ich 
triumphs were given out, specifically under Claudius and Nero (27-8). Suetonius also asserts this prodigality when 
he describes Claudius as giving triumphalia ornamenta to “very many, and very easily” (tam multis tamque facile, 
Suet. Cl. 24.3). 
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ut tamen miles otium exueret, inter Mosam Rhenumque trium et viginti milium 
spatio fossam perduxit, qua incerta Oceani vitarentur. insigne tamen triumphi 
indulsit Caesar, quamvis bellum negavisset. (11.20.2) 
The narrator’s mockery of these actions being awarded an honorary triumph is clear. The 
original description of these actions stands as the clearest proof of this – the canal is dug between 
these rivers only because Corbulo’s soldiers had been d nied their war and had nothing else to 
do. Corbulo received a triumph for having his soldiers do busy work. The canal surely was 
legitimately helpful, but in no way deserving of such a high military honor. The narrator makes 
sure to draw this to his reader’s attention in the final sentence: “Caesar bestowed upon him an 
honorary triumph, although he had denied him a war.” This sentence clearly reminds the reader 
that Corbulo had somehow been awarded a military honor despite the fact that he was not 
engaged in a war. 
 That the narrator was citing this award specifically in an effort to draw attention to his 
ideas about the role of triumphs in the principate is made more evident when his account is 
compared to that of Dio. While in Dio’s account, Corbulo is still recalled from his army 
specifically in order that he not gain any more renow  (Κλαύδιος...τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν 
αὐτοῦ...μαθὼν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψεν αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλέον αὐξηθῆναι, Dio/Xiph. 60.30.4), the triumph that 
he receives for this year is pretty clearly described as having been awarded for his campaign 
against the Germans and not for the canal. Dio narrates the event thus: “Even so, he nonetheless 
obtained an honorary triumph. Having gotten his army back…he ordered his army to dig a canal 
all the way between the Rhine and the Meuse” (τιμῶν μέντοι ἐπινικίων καὶ ὣς ἔτυχε. πιστευθεὶς 
δὲ πάλιν τὸ στράτευμα...διετάφρευσε δι’ αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε Ῥήνου καὶ τοῦ Μόσου, 
Dio/Xiphil. 60.30.6). The order of the narration of this story in Dio’s account makes it very clear 
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that Corbulo is awarded this triumph before returning to his army and having them dig the canal 
between the Rhine and the Meuse. This, then, suggests that Tacitus has shaped his account of 
this event specifically in order to highlight the cheapness of honorary triumphs in the principate 
of Claudius (and later of Nero).38 
 If the narrator’s opinion of the nature of honorary triumphs was not clear from the 
previous example, he makes sure to clarify in the very next section: 
Not much later, Curtius Rufus obtained the same honor because he had opened up 
a mine for mining silver in Mattiacan territory. The profit from it was slight and 
short-lived, but the work was destructive to the legions…Because similar things 
were being suffered throughout many provinces, [the soldiery] composed a secret 
letter in the name of the armies, begging the emperor that he grant the honorary 
triumphs to [the generals] before an army was entrusted to them. 
Nec multo post Curtius Rufus eundem honorem adipiscitur, qui in agro Mattiaco 
recluserat specus quaerendis venis argenti; unde tenuis fructus nec in longum 
fuit, at legionibus cum damno labor… quia plures per rovincias similia 
tolerabantur, componit occultas litteras nomine exercituum, precantium 
imperatorem, ut, quibus permissurus esset exercitus, tri mphalia ante tribueret. 
(11.20.3) 
In this section, the narrator makes clear his belief that the awarding of honorary triumphs was 
getting out of hand and also asserts that the Roman army was aware of it as well. First of all, his 
                                                 
38 Whether or not Dio used Tacitus is very difficult to tell – Goodyear 1972, in discussing their relationship, 
concludes that “In this situation one must despair of certainty” (180). 
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description of the mine’s profits as “slight and short-lived” shows that, on top of the fact that this 
was, as above, not a military action, it was not even a very useful one. Further, its 
characterization as “destructive to the legions” makes this action seem even less beneficial. The 
attitude of the soldiers toward these ridiculous triumphs is exhibited in the narrator’s description 
of them writing a letter to Claudius and asking him to grant generals their triumphs before they 
subjected their armies to such tasks.39  
 There are also generals in the later books of the Annales who obtain honorary triumphs 
for their military achievements, though even these men are portrayed as having not done as much 
to earn their triumphs as one would expect. Pomponius Secundus, governor of Upper Germany, 
is one of these examples. His military accomplishments against the Chatti do not seem 
necessarily deserving of a triumph. He splits his army into two forces – one force surrounds 
(circumvenere, 12.27.3) the Chatti and frees some Roman soldiers who had been taken captive, 
but are not described as actually causing any harm to the Chattan soldiers. The other half of his 
forces do meet the Chatti in a battle, but when they return to camp, Pomponius prepares them for 
a Chattan counterattack. Pomponius’ preparation of his army for a counterattack implies that the 
original battle was not terribly damaging to the Chatti’s forces, else they would not have had the 
option of a counter. The Chatti eventually surrender to the Romans, but the narrator specifically 
mentions that this was due to their realization that ey had enemies pressing upon them not only 
from the Roman side, but from the Cheruscan as well (illi metu, ne hinc Romanus, inde 
Cherusci… circumgrederentur, legatos in urbem et obsides misere, 12.28.2). It is here that the 
narrator says that Pomponius was awarded an honorary triumph for his actions, which the 
                                                 




narrator has above described as the surrounding of some enemies and the freeing of some slaves 
on one side (with no implication of any battle taking place), and a relatively minor victory on the 
other. The narrator further belittles Pomponius’ achievement with his closing remarks about the 
triumph, calling it “a modest part of his fame in posterity, among whom the renown of his poems 
surpassed it” (modica pars famae eius apud posteros, in quis carminu  gloria praecellit, 
12.28.2). That a triumph, honorary or otherwise, could be a “modest part” of somebody’s fame 
truly speaks to the diminished importance of the triumph in the principate. 
 Though the narrator’s contempt toward the awarding of this triumph is not nearly as 
blatant as his feelings toward Corbulo’s and Rufus’ triumphs (described above), the implication 
that Pomponius’ actions were not militarily worthy of a triumph is still likely. When used in a 
military context, circumvenio never specifically entails killing in the Annales. It is sometimes 
specifically opposed to killing (i.e., caesi aut circumventi, 3.74.2), sometimes accompanied with 
a different verb that indicates that killing took place (i.e., navium quasdam…circumvenere 
barbari, praefecto cohortis et plerisque auxiliarium interfectis, 12.17.3), and often is virtually 
identical to circumsideo (e.g., 12.16.2, 12.50.2). Further, the circumventi are often explicitly 
shown to have survived their surrounding (e.g., 1.65.6, 12.14.2-3), and only rarely is their fate 
left ambiguous (14.32.2, 15.4.2), but this ambiguity seems to be due to the fact that the 
circumventi are not men of much significance in either instance. So from the standpoint of 
numbers of soldiers, Pomponius’ actions against the C atti do not seem to have accomplished 
much. 
To further diminish the importance of Pomponius’ triumph, the only other actions taken 
against the Chatti by a Roman army that are narrated in the Annales are led by none other than 
Germanicus, who also earns a triumph for his efforts. Germanicus’ actions against the Chatti are 
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significantly more noteworthy than Pomponius’ – he burns down their capital city (1.56.4), and 
he later sends Gaius Silius against them with a force f 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry 
(2.25.1) and, though the result of this campaign is not specifically described, their very limited 
presence in the rest of the work implies that the Catti were severely weakened by this defeat. 
The contrast between the narrator’s descriptions of Germanicus’ large-scale, and possibly 
devastating, operations against the Chatti and the much smaller, and far less devastating, actions 
of Pomponius Secundus also draws a strong contrast between the sorts of actions that warrant an 
honorary triumph, and this contrast does not reflect positively upon the progression of the 
principate. 
 The negative effect that these honorary triumphs are described as having on the military 
state of the principate is made even worse by the way that many generals are described as 
reacting once they have attained a certain level of success. It is frequently the case that a general 
begins putting forth much less effort in his military duties thereafter. A specific example of this 
phenomenon is described by the narrator in the case of Publius Ostorius. Ostorius is described as 
winning a number of battles in Britain and being awarded an honorary triumph for doing so. 
After this honor, the narrator comments that his affairs had been successful until that point, but 
began to waver shortly thereafter (p osperis ad id rebus eius, mox ambiguis, 12.38.2).  
Though the author attributes this twist of fate to the defeat of Caratacus (either because 
the Romans believed the chief threat had been removd, or because the Silures began fighting 
harder because of his death, 12.38.2), the actions of O torius’ successor, Aulus Didius, seem to 
characterize the attitude that imperial generals had toward their various successes: “Didius, 
heavy with age and because of his great supply of honors, considered it sufficient to act through 
aides and to ward off the enemy” (Didius, senectute gravis et multa copia honorum, per 
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ministros agere et arcere hostem satis habebat, 12.40.5).40 Here the narrator is specifically 
attributing Didius’ lack of offensive effort to the fact that he had already attained a certain level 
of success. He is not lacking in manpower, nor is there a lack of enemies to fight – he stops 
fighting “because of his great supply of honors.” 
The easy acquisition of honorary triumphs, as well as the generals’ reactions to their 
acquisitions of these triumphs, seem to be indicative of generalship in the Claudian and Neronian 
principates as described by Tacitus. Both of these factors can be seen as reactions to the notion 
that generals needed to keep their popularity at a level inferior to that of the princeps – the easier 
acquisition of triumphs being a reaction from the side of the princeps to satisfy his generals’ 
need for some tangible evidence of their success, and the reaction to the acquisition of the 
triumphs from the side of the generals to temper th degree of their success. More often than not 




The exception to this sluggishness in generalship is Domitius Corbulo – he, unlike any 
other generals as described in the Annales, is successful in his campaigns and also retains them
for long periods of time. This is due to the specific way in which he balances his traditional 
military victories with his more diplomatic victories and his deference to the princeps.  
                                                 
40 Furneaux 1908 calls multa copia honorum an ablative of quality (110), but surely there is also some degree of 
causality expressed here, as well as with senectute gravis. Otherwise neither phrase contributes any additional 
meaning to the sentence, and Tacitus is surely not o e to use unnecessary words. 
60 
 
In a traditional military sense, Corbulo’s Syrian campaigns are successful throughout. In 
the year 58, he captured the Armenian stronghold of Volandum, as well as other smaller 
fortifications (13.39.1), and later in that same year he completely destroyed the Armenian capital 
of Artaxata (13.41.2). In the year 60, he captured the city of Tigranocerta as well as the 
stronghold of Legerda, before marching his army into Syria (14.23-26). These traditional 
military successes are accompanied by traditional military motivations – Corbulo’s reason for the 
destruction of Artaxata is described thus by the narrator:  
…because it was not able to be held without a significant force because of the size 
of its walls, and we did not have enough resources which could be divided for 
maintaining the garrison and pursuing the war, nor,if it were left intact and 
unprotected, was there any usefulness or glory in having captured it. 
quia nec teneri poterant sine valido praesidio ob magnitudinem moenium, nec id 
nobis virium erat, quod firmando praesidio et capessendo bello divideretur, vel, si 
integra et incustodita relinquerentur, nulla in eo utilitas aut gloria, quod capta 
essent. (13.41.2) 
This is the sort of motivation that one would expect from a Julius Caesar or a Germanicus – there 
is no glory in leaving Artaxata behind to be enjoyed by the enemies, so it must be destroyed. 
Corbulo, a general who had already received an honorary triumph (11.20.2), was pursuing 
further glory. 
 What the narrator seems to portray as the chief reason for Corbulo’s continued pursuit of 
glory going unpunished is the fact that he tempers the e glorious military victories with much 
more subtle, diplomatic ones. For example, in the aftermath of the capture of Legerda, the 
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narrator describes Corbulo as arranging his troops in such a way that his enemy would have to 
give up on fighting a war with the Romans: “after h had sent forth Verulanus the legate with the 
auxiliaries and he himself had hastened the legions, [Corbulo] compelled [Tiridates] to depart 
from afar and dismiss the hope of a war” (praemisso cum auxiliis Verulano legato atque ipse 
legionibus citis abire procul ac spem belli omittere subegit, 14.26.1). It seems unlikely that this 
action, coming in the immediate aftermath of the captures of multiple enemy strongholds, was 
taken due to a lack of confidence in the odds of his army’s success. In fact Ash, in her discussion 
of the differences between Tacitus’ Corbulo and the on  described in Frontinus’ Strategemata, 
describes Tacitus as “draw[ing] attention to Corbulo’s subversive but efficient fighting 
techniques, where intimidation supercedes direct mili ary action.”41 The above-described scene 
of the aftermath of the sack of Legerda perfectly illustrates this – instead of committing to 
another battle, Corbulo intimidates his foes into a hasty retreat. What seems likely, then, is that in 
describing the motivation for this action the narrato  is able to emphasize Corbulo’s use of a 
more moderate style of generalship in which he tempers his successes through, amongst other 
devices, intimidation, lest his popularity exceed a safe level.  
 That the narrator is making an effort to describe Corbulo as purposely restraining his 
success is evident throughout Annales 15 in particular – he is often portrayed as having thoughts 
that indicate just this. Upon hearing that the Parthi n king Vologaeses was planning an assault on 
the Romans in Armenia, Corbulo first sends out two legions to defend the province, secretly 
advising them to act with composure, rather than haste (occulto praecepto, compositius cuncta 
quam festinantius agerent, 15.3.1). Immediately thereafter, he sends a letter to Nero, letting him 
                                                 
41 Ash 2006: 370, where she points out Frontinus’ narration of the siege of Tigranocerta, at which Corbulo is 
described as beheading one of the captured Armenian nobles and launching his head, via ballista, into the midst of a 
war council, which causes an immediate surrender of the city (Frontin. Str. 2.9.5). 
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know that Armenia needed its own general, because ho tilities were about to break out there. The 
reason that he does this, the narrator comments, is because “he obviously preferred to have a war 
than to fight one” (quippe bellum habere quam gerere malebat, scripseratque Caesari proprio 
duce opus esse, qui Armeniam defenderet, 15.3.1). This sentence is interesting in a couple of 
ways. First, the narrator’s use of the adverb quippe could potentially be making a strong 
statement about his beliefs about military matters under the principate. A very plausible reading 
of the sense of this adverb could be that Corbulo “obviously” preferred to have a war at hand for 
administrating, rather than to fight one, because he realized that fighting an additional successful 
war would bring him to a level of renown that was not safe for him, whereas having a war at 
hand would allow him the opportunity for further diplomatic affairs.42 Second, Corbulo’s 
characterization as immediately requesting that the coming war be given over to a different 
general speaks to the change in generals’ attitudes. Where in the republic we would see Marius 
trying to pull some strings in order to steal the command against Mithridates from Sulla, to 
whom it had been voted by the senate, here we see Corbulo voluntarily requesting that a different 
general be appointed to fight a war that had shown up right on his own doorstep. This must have 
been motivated by the same thinking that led Aelius Gracilis to warn Lucius Vetus not to lead his 
army into another’s province, lest he bring danger upon himself (and that wasn’t even for a 
campaign!). It seems that the narrator assumes a level at which a general’s fame started to 
endanger his life, and describes his characters as reacting to this idea. Corbulo is further 
described as having some idea of this when he sends word to Vologaeses “thinking that his 
                                                 
42 Miller 1973: 49: “the phrase could (just) mean that Corbulo wanted to avoid open warfare with Parthia: but…it 
seems likely that Tacitus is presenting Corbulo as ambitious. If he completed the campaign or suffered d feat (both 
possible in bellum gerere), he might be recalled: to keep it simmering (habere) would ensure that he was needed to 
supervise it.” This description coincides perfectly with my proposal of Corbulo’s realization that diplomacy is 




fortune ought to be restrained, even though his affairs were successful” (quamvis secundis rebus 
suis, moderandum fortunae ratus, 15.5.1).  
 The description of Corbulo’s attitude toward generalship paints a picture of a general 
who realizes that diplomacy is just as important as tactics, and that his diplomatic successes will 
not arouse the amount of danger that his military ones might have. Corbulo’s belief that 
diplomacy and battle are two equal halves of the same whole is demonstrated in his reaction to 
his associate Caesennius Paetus’ military failures. When Vologaeses, having defeated Paetus’ 
army, requests that his peace talks with Corbulo take place at the same location at which he had 
defeated Paetus, Corbulo is described as thinking that “ he dissimilarity of the result would 
increase his own glory” (dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret, 15.28.2). Here we see the 
narrator portraying Corbulo as specifically equating the glory that Paetus lost in battle with the 
glory that he himself would gain through a successful negotiation.  
 
Why Corbulo? 
 Corbulo is described by the narrator as quite an anomaly in the later books of the 
Annales. He continues to win significant battles even after h  is awarded an honorary triumph, he 
fights in numerous campaigns across a span of many years, and he is able to strike a balance 
between diplomacy and battle that keeps him from being deprived of his army and called back to 
Rome. Though through his portrayal of other generals the narrator seems to suggest that the 
military has become useless under the principate, wi h many either obtaining an honorary 
triumph and then resting on their laurels or even nver giving much effort in the first place, his 
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description of Corbulo shows that there is still hope for some continued renown for the Roman 
military.  
 Corbulo’s career is, as described by the narrator, very similar to that of Germanicus.43 
Consul at a relatively young age (Germanicus was 27, Corbulo 32), they each received their first 
command in Lower Germany and fought campaigns against the Cherusci, from which they were 
both recalled before completion, but for which they r ceived triumphs nonetheless. After a brief 
respite in Rome, they both were then sent to settle affairs in Armenia. Tacitus’ emphasis on 
Corbulo as the paragon of the new imperial style of generalship also seems to be motivated by 
factors other than the historical facts of his long-enduring exploits and their similarities to those 
of Germanicus, though. Corbulo and Germanicus are also both described quite similarly in 
regards to their personalities as generals. 
 One point that the narrator describes both Germanicus and Corbulo as having emphasized 
to their soldiers is the importance of adhering to the “traditional ways.” In the speech that the 
narrator attributes to Germanicus in his address to the revolting German legions, the very first 
thing he asks the soldiers is “Where is your soldierly self-restraint? Where is the honor of 
traditional discipline?” (ubi modestia militaris, ubi veteris disciplinae decus, 1.35.1). One of the 
first actions Corbulo is described as taking when h arrives among the legions of Lower 
Germany, who are described as “unaccustomed to workand labor” (operum et laboris ignavas), 
is that he “led them back to the traditional ways” (veterem ad morem reduxit, 11.18.2). Surely, 
taking into account the description of the legions as lazy, we are supposed to recognize that a 
                                                 
43 Ash 2006, though she does not attribute the similarity in their careers to Tacitus’ purposeful characterization of 
these men, also points out the similarity: “The careers of Germanicus, Corbulo, Antonius Primus, and Agricola, 
despite individual differences, all follow similar b oad trajectories” (375).  
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chief aspect of the veterem morem to which Corbulo led his armies was a renewed sense of 
discipline. So we see here that both of these generals, upon first arriving among their new troops, 
notice their soldiers’ lack of discipline and they both recall the traditional (vetus) ways of the 
army in order to fix this problem. 
 Germanicus and Corbulo share some similarities on the battlefield as well. One important 
trait that they share is that they are both portrayed as having such well-executed systems of 
information-gathering that they can anticipate their enemies’ attacks. An example of 
Germanicus’ preparation is provided in this description from his German campaign: “None of 
this was unknown to [Germanicus]. Places and plans, things both disclosed and hidden, he knew, 
and he turned the strategies of the enemies into their own destruction” (nihil ex eis Caesari 
incognitum: consilia locos, prompta occulta noverat as usque hostium in perniciem ipsis 
vertebat, 2.20.1). Corbulo’s well-informed nature as a general is described in a much less 
detailed fashion: “[Tiridates] suddenly surrounded the Roman column, though our leader was not 
unaware” (repente agmen Romanum circumfundit, non ignaro ducenostro, 13.40.1). Although 
the description might not be as eloquent as that of Germanicus, the result is still the same – the 
battle that follows this statement is immediately followed by the complete destruction of the 
Armenian capital of Artaxata at Corbulo’s hands. So both generals, in addition to emphasizing 
traditional discipline among the soldiery, are described as having been themselves disciplined in 
the management of their information-gathering, which leads to their success over their enemies. 
 Their emphasis on discipline did not make them only mi itarily successful, though. Their 
military successes reveal their popularity among the Roman people, who are described as being 
nervous about what the popularity of each of these men might result in. During Germanicus’ 
triumph for the campaign against the Germans that he was forbidden to complete, the Roman 
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people are described as being overcome by a “hidden fear” (occulta formido) that Germanicus 
will not be long-lived, since “the loves of the Roman people are brief and unfortunate” (breves et 
infaustos populi Romani amores, 2.41.3). In a similar fashion, Corbulo’s successful (though also 
incomplete) campaign against the Germans is described as being considered “inauspicious to 
some” (apud quosdam sinistra). The people to whom this thought is occurring proclaim “but if 
he succeeds, an outstanding man endangers peace and is grievous to a cowardly emperor” (sin 
prospere egisset, formidolosum paci virum insignem et ignavo principi praegravem, 11.19.3). 
Though there are other moments throughout the Annales in which the idea that success is 
frightening to the emperor is discussed, these are the only two instances in which the Roman 
people, in reaction to a specific success, lament the possibility of the successful general’s 
downfall.  
 An additional, very particular, sort of popularity that these generals share is that exhibited 
by foreigners and, more specifically, enemies. When G rmanicus dies, he (according to the 
narrator) is mourned throughout the empire: “Foreign nations and kings mourned: he exhibited 
such generosity toward his allies, such clemency toward his enemies” (indoluere exterae 
nationes regesque: tanta illi comitas in socios, mansuetudo in hostes, 2.72.2). Though the 
allegiance of the mourning foreigners is not explicitly described, the phrase immediately 
following seems to be included as a clarification of the reasons for the foreign peoples’ 
mourning. If this is the case, then we can assume that the socios and the hostes are two subsets of 
the exterae nationes regesque, with their different reasons for mourning him being described. 
Germanicus’ lack of clemency as described by the narrator throughout the German campaigns 
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seems to indicate that the narrator is going out of his way to describe Germanicus as likable to 
his enemies, even if it was not the case.44  
 Corbulo’s popularity among his enemies is described much more straightforwardly. 
When Corbulo first arrived into the east, there wasa dispute about whether an exchange of 
hostages with King Vologaeses in Syria should be conducted by Corbulo or by Quadratus, the 
governor of the province. Vologaeses’ people are described as preferring to deal with Corbulo, a 
man “with a certain favor, even from his enemies” (inclinatione quadam etiam hostium, 13.9.2). 
He is later described in a similarly straightforward fashion: “Neither hostile nor odious was the 
name of Corbulo considered, even to the barbarians, and for this reason they believed that his 
counsel was trustworthy” (non infensum nec cum hostili odio Corbulonis nomen etiam barbaris 
habebatur, eoque consilium eius fidum credebant, 15.28.1). Corbulo’s description as trustworthy 
to his enemies, unlike Germanicus’, is supported by the narrative of the Annales. If it is the case, 
as argued above, that the narrator’s description of Germanicus is not entirely true in this respect, 
then his effort to make that point about Germanicus can be seen as his creating one more 
example with which he could liken Corbulo and Germanicus. 
 As can be seen, Corbulo and Germanicus share many personal traits, all of which have to 
do with their style of generalship. Though in the “big picture” their actions are quite different 
(Germanicus charges forth into battle at every opportunity, in a very republican fashion, while 
Corbulo tempers his victories on the battlefield with victories at the negotiating table, the mark 
of the new imperial general), they are described by the narrator in a very similar fashion in the 
way that they conducted their campaigns on a smaller scale – they kept their soldiers disciplined, 
                                                 
44 For further discussion on this, see Goodyear 1981 ad loc. 
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they kept themselves well-informed, the Romans worried about their well-being, and their 
enemies respected them.  
 It cannot be a coincidence that Corbulo, whom the narrator presents as the embodiment 
of the new imperial style of generalship, is both historically and literarily likened to Germanicus, 
Tacitus’ “hero,” throughout the Annales. The message that Tacitus seems to be imparting 
through this similarity is that, no matter how much generalship might have been forced to change 
during the principate, there was still hope of military glory. He seems to be trying to show, 
through his similar descriptions of Germanicus and Corbulo, that although there was an 
overwhelming number of examples of generals who gave themselves over to sluggishness and 
ditch-digging in order to win their renown under the principate, it was still possible for generals 
to win their renown through the sort of virtus that Germanicus had displayed during his 
campaigns. 
 An additional possible reason for the significance attributed to Corbulo in particular in 
the Annales is an effort on Tacitus’ part to condemn Trajan’s foreign policy choices concerning 
the Parthians.45 While Trajan refuses to crown a Parthian as the king of Armenia but instead 
amasses a force to fight the Parthians over control of Armenia, Corbulo is described by the 
narrator of the Annales as acknowledging the potential conflict with the Parthi ns but eventually 
settling things with them diplomatically. The significant failure of Trajan’s expedition, on which 
he would end up losing his life, surely provided to the Romans additional proof that peaceful 
dealings with the Parthians were the only plausible on s. This seems to be one of the strongest 
explanations for Tacitus’ emphasis on Corbulo in the later books of the Annales – his successful 
                                                 
45 For discussion of this aspect of Corbulo’s presence, see Syme 1958, 492-7 and Vervaet 1999. 
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negotiations with the Parthians in Armenia would stand in stark contrast to the failed military 
campaign of Trajan and would reaffirm the idea thate only beneficial attitude to have toward 
the Parthians was a peaceful one.  
 
Conclusion 
 Corbulo’s significant presence in the later books f the Annales seems to have been 
motivated by two factors, both of which emphasized his role as a military man who successfully 
conducted his business through negotiation with his enemies. From his early descriptions of 
Germanicus’ campaigns, Tacitus’ goal in his narration of military matters in the Annales has 
been to illustrate to his readers that military success was still very possible under the principate, 
but that it could not be achieved in the same way as it previously had been. He does this by 
tracing the progression from Tiberius’ jealous attitude toward successful men, with specific 
emphasis on his attitude toward Germanicus, to Corbul ’s new style of generalship and the 
longevity of his career under Nero. Corbulo’s emphasis on negotiation, especially when viewed 
in contrast with Germanicus and Trajan’s careers, st ongly suggests that Tacitus wanted his 
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